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Ironing Out the Flat Tax
David A. Weisbach*
While the Flat Tax has attracted substantial attention, proponents of the
tax have not given any details of its implementation. Without this detail,
evaluation of the tax is difficult. Claims of simplicity may be false. The effi-
ciency claims for the Flat Tax rely on its relative unavoidability and its cleanly
stated economic incentives, but without details, these claims cannot be evalu-
ated Moreover, the distribution of the tax burden will be affected by its imple-
mentation. This article attempts to fill in the gap by considering the design is-
sues presented by the Flat Tax. A wide variety of issues are considered, in-
cluding the Flat Tax taxation offinancial transactions, business formations and
reorganizations, small businesses, accounting methods, and international
transactions. The major finding is that the regime will be complex and difficult
to implement, although still somewhat simpler than current law. The tax will
also be easily avoidable, which will reduce its efficiency. Without the claims of
simplicity and efficiency, the argument for the Flat Tax becomes extremely
weak
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This article considers the design and implementation of the Flat Tax.,
The Flat Tax consists of two parts, a tax on individuals and a tax on busi-
nesses. Individuals are taxed on wages and other employee compensation.
Dividends, interest, and capital gains are not taxed to individuals. No per-
sonal deductions, such as the deductions for mortgage interest or charitable
donations, are allowed. The individual tax is progressive at the lower end
through a personal allowance or standard deduction, and flat thereafter.
The business tax is computed much like a VAT.2 Businesses are taxed on
the difference between gross receipts from sales of property or services and
the cost of business inputs, wages, and retirement contributions. The tax
provides current expensing of all business purchases, businesses may not
deduct interest or dividends or other financial payments, and financial in-
come is not included when received.
1. The term "flat tax" could mean any number of different things. Most generically, one
might think it refers to any tax that has a proportional rather than progressive rate structure. As
used in this article, Flat Tax (capitalized to indicate the specificity of the reference) refers to the
specific proposal set forth by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka and advocated by prominent policy-
makers. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995). See also The
Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995).
2. A VAT, or value added tax, is a type of consumption tax used widely throughout the world.
See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra for an explanation of value added taxes.
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Flat Tax proposals offer few additional details. We do not know, for ex-
ample, the rules for such everyday transactions as the formation or liquida-
tion of a business or the sale of property on credit. Given the immense size
and complexity of our economy, the simple outline of the Flat Tax offered by
its proponents does not come close to legislation that could actually be en-
acted.
Without additional details, evaluation of the Flat Tax is difficult. Much
of the appeal of the Flat Tax lies in its alleged simplicity-the vaunted post-
card returns resonate with many. If the claims of simplicity are not correct,
the Flat Tax may be significantly less attractive. Moreover, the efficiency
claims for the Flat Tax rely in part on simple, clearly stated economic incen-
tives and relative unavoidability. If, once implemented, the Flat Tax is com-
plex and avoidable, the efficiency claims may falter.3 And the fairness
claims for the Flat Tax, regardless of their merit, become weaker if the tax is
avoidable. In particular, an avoidable tax will have different distributive
consequences (most likely more regressive) than the simple, unavoidable tax
championed by proponents of the Flat Tax. The devil for the Flat Tax might
truly be in the details. To date, however, no details of the design of the Flat
Tax have been offered.
This article attempts to fill this gap by beginning the study of the design
of the Flat Tax.4 The article is organized around a central feature of the Flat
Tax that has not previously drawn attention-something I call "openness."
By openness I mean that deductions claimed by one taxpayer are not neces-
sarily offset by inclusions of another (and vice versa). After explaining how
the Flat Tax is open, I will explore five central design elements that are af-
fected by openness. I will also briefly consider additional issues that must be
resolved before implementing the tax.
3. For example, a central assumption in the efficiency analysis of the Flat Tax is that the tran-
sition regime is unavoidable. Only by looking at implementation, however, can it be determined if
it is indeed unavoidable. (The conclusion below is that the transition regime will be avoidable.)
4. There have been several prior articles discussing design issues in the Flat Tax or similar
taxes. The most comprehensive is Richard L. Doemberg, A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax,
70 IOWA L. REV. 425 (1985) (evaluating the Hall and Rabushka proposal in light of several char-
acteristics of the current tax system). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DIsCUssION
OF IsSUES RELATING TO "FLAT" TAX RATE PROPOSALS (Joint Comm. Print 1995) (discussing
background of flat tax proposals and several technical aspects relating to implementation); Michael
Calegari, Flat Taxes and Effective Tax Planning, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 689 (1998) (discussing tax
avoidance strategies that would be successful under a Hall-Rabushka model); Alan L. Feld, Living
with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 603 (1995) (discussing implementation problems with the Flat
Tax); Vernon Hoven, Flat Tax as Seen by a Tax Preparer, 68 TAX NOTES 747 (1995) (addressing
the implications of the Armey-Shelby flat tax proposal on tax planning); Ronald A. Pearlman,
Fresh from the River Styx: The Achilles' Heels of Tax Reform Proposals, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 569
(1998) (discussing tax planning responses to any major tax policy reform including the Flat Tax).
See Alan Schenk, The Business Transfer Tax: The Value Added by Subtraction, 30 TAX NoTES 351
(1986), for a discussion of subtraction-method VATs which, as noted in the text, resemble the Flat
Tax.
FLATTAX
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 601 1999-2000
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
This article will address only the design issues relating to the Flat Tax. It
will not discuss the merits of an income tax versus a consumption tax.5 Nor
will it discuss important questions of economic efficiency or the equitable
distribution of the tax burden under the Flat Tax, except as they arise from
design problems. The transition to the Flat Tax will be discussed briefly, but
mostly with respect to design issues, not efficiency or fairness concerns. In
addition, the article will assume that the Flat Tax is enacted in relatively pure
form, so that political compromises that introduce additional complexity are
not discussed. These issues are all important but are well covered in prior
literature.6 The major hole remaining is the design of the system.
Although this article is written at the level of implementation rather than
theory, there are two important underlying theoretical problems. First, sup-
pose we identify an anomaly in the treatment of a transaction under the Flat
Tax. Someone might be over- or under-taxed, or there may be an unintended
incentive-maybe a loophole-that causes taxpayers to structure transactions
inefficiently to avoid tax. The question is whether the tax should be
amended to fix the anomaly or whether it should be left as is. This requires a
trade-off between the administrative costs of fixing the problem and the inef-
ficiency, unfairness, and revenue effects of leaving the anomaly. How these
trade-offs should be made is not fully resolved.7 The original designers of
the Flat Tax, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka had a strong preference for
simplicity as witnessed by the proposed elimination of all personal deduc-
tions. But they failed to identify a large number of issues, and decisions
must be made on these issues. The recommendations here are based on my
judgment about the costs of complexity compared to the costs of a given
anomaly. These judgments may be completely wrong (although I don't think
so), but the point of the article is not to recommend final resolution of the
issues but rather to identify the issues that must be dealt with in designing the
Flat Tax and to evaluate the costs of solutions.
Second, in evaluating claims of administrative costs and complexity,
there is no easily defendable baseline for comparison. Theoretically, one
would compare either absolute or marginal administrative costs of each sys-
tem. But in practice it is convenient to compare one system to another. Most
of the comparisons in this article are to the current income tax. The reason is
that most people have some sense of the administrative costs and complexi-
ties of the current system, so comparing the Flat Tax to the current system
5. See note 8 supra for citations to discussions of the merits of income and consumption taxa-
tion.
6. For a good introduction to the literature, see ECONOMIC EFFECTs OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
7. For a discussion of this issue, see Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L.
ECON & ORG. 61 (1998); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995).
[Vol. 52:599
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provides information. In considering tax reform, other important compari-
sons would be to other potential reforms, such as a simplified income tax or a
VAT.
The Flat Tax proposed by Hall and Rabushka is a tax on consumption,
not income. Part I of this article, therefore, gives background on consump-
tion taxes and the basic mechanics of the Flat Tax. Part II introduces the
concept of openness and shows how the Flat Tax is open domestically and
internationally. Part I considers five major design issues that stem from the
openness of the Flat Tax. Part IV gives a very brief discussion of other de-
sign issues that will have to be resolved to implement the Flat Tax. Part V
evaluates the design and provides a conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Consumption Tax Basics
This Part provides background on consumption taxes in general, not
limited to the Flat Tax. This background is necessary for understanding the
Flat Tax. All of the material provided in this Part can be found in prior lit-
erature.8
The goal of a consumption tax is to capture all consumption in the econ-
omy. Instead of measuring consumption directly, say through a tax on con-
sumption purchases, consumption can be derived from income. Income in a
given period is equal to the sum of a taxpayer's consumption and his change
in savings during that period. By simple algebra, consumption is equal to
income less the change in savings (i.e., minus savings plus dissavings).
The change in savings in a given period is equal to the difference be-
tween amounts saved and amounts withdrawn from savings to be used for
consumption. We can measure this difference by measuring difference in
receipts from the sale of investments and the outlays for the purchase of in-
vestments. Net receipts in a period means that the taxpayer withdrew sav-
ings to consume and net payments means the taxpayer saved. As a result, we
can tax consumption by measuring cash flows, including receipts, and de-
8. The literature is vast. For basic background on the operation of consumption taxes, see
DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); William D. Andrews, A Consump-
tion-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About
Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1575 (1979); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income
Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996); Alvin
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
For background on value-added taxes, see, among other books and articles, CHARLES E. McLURE,
JR., THE VALUED-ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION? (1987). For economic analysis, see
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM
(1997); ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 6.
FL4TTAX
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ducting outlays (other than consumption outlays). A tax following this pat-
tern is called a personal cash-flow consumption tax.
One important consequence of this logic is that the major difference be-
tween an income tax and a consumption tax is the timing of basis recovery.
In an income tax, there is no deduction for savings. Instead, investments are
given tax basis which is recovered when the investment is recovered (e.g.,
through depreciation or on sale). In a cash-flow consumption tax, basis is
recovered immediately through a deduction for outlays (i.e., investments are
expensed).
A second consequence of this logic is that, under certain assumptions, a
consumption tax does not tax (exempts) the yield on investments. The intui-
tion is that the immediate deduction in the cash-flow consumption tax creates
tax savings, which can be invested. When the investment is sold, the tax-
payer must pay tax on the full amount realized, but the tax is exactly equal to
the invested value of the original tax savings.
Example
Suppose a taxpayer earns $100 and wants to invest it. Assume the taxpayer has
two choices: an investment that is immediately deductible but which is fully
taxed on sale, and an investment that is not deductible but whose yield is ex-
empt. Assume the tax rate is forty percent and that the pre-tax return on in-
vestments during the relevant time period is fifty percent.
If the taxpayer invests in the asset with the exempt yield, the taxpayer must first
pay tax on the $100 earnings. Thus, the taxpayer must pay a tax of $40 and has
only $60 to invest. The $60 will earn a fifty percent return, or $30, which is not
taxed. Withdrawing the initial $60 invested is tax free, leaving the taxpayer
with $90.
If the taxpayer invests in the deductible investment, the taxpayer can invest the
full $100. The $100 will earn a fifty percent return giving the taxpayer $150.
When the cash is withdrawn from the investment, the taxpayer must pay a tax
of forty percent of $150, or $60, leaving $90. Thus, the immediately deductible
investment and the yield-exempt investment leave the taxpayer in the identical
place, with $90.9
9. Stated algebraically, a taxpayer earns $x and is subject to tax rate t. The return on invest-
ments is i. If the investment of Sx is not deductible but the yield is exempt, taxpayer is subject to an
immediate tax on x leaving Sx (1 - t) to invest. The taxpayer's position after n periods is:
$x (I -t) (1 + IT
If the taxpayer can deduct the investment, the taxpayer can invest the full amount and the pre-tax
position after n periods is $x (1 + i)f. The taxpayer is taxed on the return (and the withdrawal of the
investment), leaving the taxpayer with:
x(l+0IT(1- 0
These two expressions are equivalent.
The assumptions behind the equivalence are listed in Graetz, supra note 8. Other than the as-
sumptions concerning inframarginal returns, discussed in the text accompanying notes 11-13 infra
(i.e., that the taxpayer can immediately invest the tax savings at the same rate of return as the origi-
nal investment), the most important assumption is that rates are not progressive (or, more narrowly,
that the taxpayer stays in the same tax bracket) and stay the same during the term of the investment.
[Vol. 52:599
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A cash-flow consumption tax allows immediate deductions for all in-
vestments and, therefore, under the assumptions, exempts the yield on in-
vestments. Thus, we can replicate a cash-flow consumption tax by simply
not taxing the yield on assets but also not allowing a deduction for purchases.
This method of taxation is called yield-exemption. The Flat Tax uses yield
exemption for nonbusiness assets such as housing.O
If this equivalence holds, the cash-flow consumption tax is just a tax on
wages. The reason is that there are only two types of resources , labor and
capital. If the return to capital is exempt, only labor is taxed, effectively cre-
ating a wage tax (treating all returns to labor as wages). There are, however,
two major exceptions to the cash-flow, yield-exemption equivalence.
First, a cash-flow tax taxes certain returns in excess of the market rate of
return, known as inframarginal returns. An investment has an inframarginal
return if one cannot invest additional cash at the same rate. The inframar-
ginal return is the return on the investment above the normal rate of return
(i.e. the rate of return on any additional cash invested). For example, mo-
nopoly profits are inframarginal returns.
The reason that a cash-flow tax taxes inframarginal returns is that tax-
payers cannot fully "gross-up" their investments by the tax savings because
the savings must be invested at a lower rate than the original investment.
The return on their investment of the tax savings from a deduction earns only
the marginal rate of return, not the inframarginal rate. These returns will be
insufficient to pay the tax on the original investment (which will have grown
more quickly) when the investment is sold.
Example
The facts are the same as above in which the taxpayer earns $100 and wants to
invest it. Suppose, however, that the marginal rate for investments is ten per-
cent, but the taxpayer has an opportunity to invest $60 at a fifty percent return.
The remaining $40 (the tax savings from not paying immediate tax on the
earnings) must be invested at ten percent.
Under a cash-flow system, the taxpayer invests the full $100. After one year,
the taxpayer has $90 from $60 of the investment and $44 from the investment
of the remaining $40, for a total of $134. When the taxpayer withdraws the
money, the $134 is fully taxable. The tax liability is $53.60, leaving the tax-
payer with $80.40. Under a yield exempt tax, taxpayer invests only $60, which
grows at a fifty percent rate to $90. The difference between yield-exemption
and cash-flow taxation is $9.60.
The $60 investment produced a return forty percentage points greater than the
market return, or $24 (the $90 super-return is $24 greater than the $66 regular
10. Note that under a consumption tax, and when the assumptions hold, the present value of
the taxpayer's tax liability does not change regardless of when it is paid. Similarly, the present
value of the taxpayer's consumption bundle is the same regardless of when he consumes. In this
sense, the consumption tax is said not to distort the timing of consumption (and correspondingly,
the decision to save). This is one reason scholars have argued for adoption of a consumption tax.
Feb. 2000]
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return on the same $60 investment). A tax on this excess would be $9.60,
which is the difference between total exemption of the yield and cash-flow
taxation. Thus, cash-flow taxation taxes the return in excess of the marginal
return. 11
It is not clear what portion of investments produce inframarginal re-
turns.1 2 Inframarginal investments are not just investments that produce ex-
traordinary returns. Instead, they are investments in which one cannot invest
additional money at the same rate. So a risky start-up business may not pro-
duce inframarginal returns as additional cash would be welcome. Instead, it
may produce large returns to human capital (i.e., talent or skill) and to risk.' 3
Second, depending on the particular transition rules that are adopted, a
cash-flow consumption tax would tax all existing capital (old wealth) on a
one-time (present value) basis. Consider a taxpayer who makes a $100 in-
vestment today under the income tax. She gets basis equal to $100. Suppose
tomorrow we impose a cash-flow consumption tax, and the next day she sells
the investment for $100. When she sells the investment, she receives $100,
fully taxed under the cash-flow consumption tax. The effect is that wealth
existing on the date the consumption tax is imposed gets taxed, regardless of
whether it had previously been taxed (had tax basis) under the income tax.
Whether this happens depends on the transition rule for changing to a
new system. For example, if we eliminated the income tax and imposed a
broad-based retail sales tax (a type of consumption tax), all spending for con-
11. Note that another way to understand the example is to view the government as demanding
a portion of the inframarginal investment (equal to the tax rate). This forces the investor to put less
money into the inframarginal investment and more into marginal investments, which reduces the
investor's returns. For example, using the numbers above, the investor would be viewed as invest-
ing $36 in the inframarginal investment, getting a deduction for this investment and grossing up the
deduction for a total investment of $60, $24 of which is really the government's. When the invest-
ment is sold, the benefit of the deduction offsets the tax leaving the investor with the infimarginal
50% return on $36 (i.e., $54). The investor, however, has $60 to invest, so the investor invests the
other $24 at the market rate of 10 %, and deducts the investment and is taxed upon sale.
12. The only estimates that I am aware of are in WILLIAM M. GENTRY & R. GLENN HUB-
BARD, DISmTBuTIoNAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CONSUMPTION TAX, 28-29 tbl.6-4, 35-38 (1997).
Unfortunately, Gentry and Hubbard based their conclusions on the fact that the ratio of fair market
value to book value is higher for the wealthy. This measure, Tobin's q, may indicate the presence
of inframarginal returns but it may also reflect returns to risk. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H.
Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 546-65 (1998), for
a discussion.
13. Note that a pure income tax exempts the return from bearing risk. The intuition is that
taxpayers can adjust their portfolios to offset the nominal tax. See Warren, How Much Capital
Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, supra note 8. This return
is also exempt under the consumption tax. Thus, the only component of the return on capital that is
taxed under an income tax but not a consumption tax is the riskless return, making the distinction
between the income tax and the consumption tax very small. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note
8, at 378 ("The debate between an income tax and a consumption tax may be restated, in large part,
as a debate over the manner in which the two tax bases treat risky investments.. ."). Of course, the
current income tax is far from this pure system (particularly in its limitations on the use of losses)
and its affect on the return to risk bearing is uncertain.
[Vol. 52:599
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sumption would be subject to the tax. In particular, there would be no recov-
ery of existing income tax basis because all purchases would be subject to
the retail sales tax, even if made out of cash from the sale of assets with a
high basis under the no-longer existent income tax. If we instead imposed a
yield-exempt regime, there would be no tax on existing capital because all
returns, such as our taxpayer's receipt of $100 on the sale of her investment,
would be explicitly exempt.
While many economists treat consumption taxes as necessarily taxing
existing wealth (and taxes that do not are different types of taxes),14 there is
nothing inherent in the concept of consumption that prevents us from choos-
ing any form of transition relief desired. For example, we can choose to al-
low recovery of existing income tax basis when we switch to a consumption
tax, which would reduce the tax on existing capital to the extent it has been
taxed under the income tax (i.e., to the extent of income tax basis less liabili-
ties). The Flat Tax has no explicit transition rules and, therefore, (subject to
exceptions discussed below) attempts to tax existing wealth.'s
Transition effects raise important economic, fairness, and political issues
which may cause us to allow or deny transition relief. In particular, the effi-
ciency of a consumption tax depends substantially on transition. The as-
sumption in most efficiency analyses is that the transition tax is unavoidable.
In economists' jargon, it is lump sum. Lump sum taxes are efficient pre-
cisely because they are unavoidable-there is no effect on behavior so there
is no efficiency cost. The transition tax, which falls on all existing wealth, is
a substantial portion of the tax base in a consumption tax, and elimination of
this huge lump sum tax significantly reduces the efficiency of a consumption
tax. In some models, the effect may be large enough to change the ranking
between different types of taxes: A consumption tax with transition relief
may be less efficient than an income tax, while a consumption tax without
transition relief may be more efficient than an income tax.' 6
Similarly, the distributional effects of the transition tax are substantial.
The tax falls on existing wealth, which tends to be held by high-income tax-
payers. A consumption tax without transition relief, therefore, may be sub-
stantially more progressive than a similar tax with transition relief. The tran-
14. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other Proposals: Who will Bear the Tax
Burden?, 69 TAX NOTES 1517, 1521 (1995) (arguing that "provid[ing] relief to old capital is incon-
sistent with the fundamental nature of a consumption tax."). See also ALAN J. AUERBACH &
LAURENCE J. KoTLiKoFF, DYNAMIC FIsCAL POLICY (1987). The best interpretation of their insis-
tence that a consumption tax imposes a tax on existing wealth is that it is an attempt to impose con-
sistency of language within the community rather than an argument that there is something inherent
in the words "consumption tax" that require such a result.
15. See DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION 19-44
(1996), for a discussion of transition effects of switching to a consumption tax.
16. See, e.g., AUERBACH & KOTLIKOFF, supra note 14, at 55-87 (discussing the selection of
the tax base as an integral aspect of tax reform).
Feb. 2000]
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sition tax also redistributes between the old and the young. Because older
people hold most of the existing wealth, the transition tax falls primarily on
older individuals. A consumption tax that imposes a transition tax, therefore,
redistributes from the old to the young as compared to a system that grants
transition relief.
The Flat Tax offers no transition relief which simplifies much of the de-
sign as transition rules need not be considered.17 As will be discussed in Part
II, however, the transition tax in the Flat Tax is easily avoided. This will sig-
nificantly affect the conclusions about the efficiency and distributional ef-
fects of the Flat Tax. Avoidance of the transition tax will generally make the
Flat Tax less efficient and less progressive. To reduce avoidance of the tran-
sition tax, the Flat Tax can impose a host of complex rules, which may im-
prove the efficiency and incidence of the tax, but also will make it more
costly to administer.
Although the taxation of inframarginal returns and transition are the only
theoretical differences between yield-exempt and cash-flow taxes, there is an
important difference in implementation. In the real world, we cannot ade-
quately police the border between wages and capital. Entrepreneurs are
likely to take some of their returns to human capital in the form of a return to
physical (including intangible) capital rather than as wages. Thus, some of
Bill Gates's stock in Microsoft is best characterized as return to human
capital or wages. Many patents may primarily represent human capital. The
yield-exempt mechanism requires the tax system to make the distinction
between the two types of returns because returns to physical capital are taxed
under a completely different system (yield exemption) than returns to human
capital (taxed as wages). The cash-flow mechanism does not have to distin-
guish between these two types of returns because all cash flows are treated
identically: Returns to human capital disguised as returns to other capital are
taxed under the cash-flow mechanism exactly the same way as wages.
Example
Suppose a business owned by an individual creates a patent worth $100. Sup-
pose also that the business pays the individual wages of $30 and then the indi-
vidual sells the stock of the business for $70. Assume there were no inputs
other than the individual's labor used to create the patent so that the entire $100
is a return to labor.
Under a yield-exempt tax, the individual would pay taxes on the $30 of wages
and not pay taxes on the sale of the stock. If the wages are below the appropri-
ate amount, as they are here, the individual avoids taxes. Under a cash-flow
17. For example, the transition rules are the reason for much of the complexity of the USA
tax. See Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis Under A Consumption Tax: The USA
Tax System, 68 TAx NOTES 1109, 1109 (1995) (arguing that "the rules for recovery of pre-
enactment basis under the USA Tax System's individual tax may be deficient"); Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Savings Allowance," 68 TAX NOTEs 1103 (1995) (suggesting
tentative conclusions about the operation of the USA Tax system).
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tax, the individual would pay tax on the $30 of wages and the $70 of sales re-
ceipts. Regardless of the allocation of receipts between wages and capital, the
individual would pay the same tax.
To the extent this border is difficult to police, there may be large differences
between yield-exempt and cash-flow taxes.1 8
To summarize, a cash-flow tax taxes wages, inframarginal returns to
capital, and, on a one-time basis, all existing capital. The two major differ-
ences between a cash-flow tax and a yield-exempt tax are the tax on infra-
marginal returns and the tax on existing capital. A yield-exempt tax would
not tax inframarginal returns as all returns to capital are explicitly exempt.
Nor would a yield-exempt tax impose a tax on existing capital without a spe-
cial rule doing so because the yield on all capital is explicitly exempt. 19
Therefore, a yield-exempt tax taxes only wages. In addition, a yield-exempt
tax requires a determination of whether a given return is a return to human
capital or some other type of return while a cash-flow tax does not.
B. The Flat Tax-General Background
This Part will consider the general functioning of the Flat Tax as set forth
by Hall and Rabushka. Three points will be made. First, the Flat Tax is a
progressive consumption tax. Second, the business-level tax in the Flat Tax
exists only to tax existing wealth and inframarginal returns. Third, the Flat
Tax imposes multiple methods of taxing capital.
Begin by considering a retail-sales tax. A retail-sales tax is a direct tax
on consumption purchases. If applied to all consumption purchases in the
economy, it would be a consumption tax, equivalent in overall effect to the
cash-flow tax discussed above.
The explanations of why the retail-sales tax and the cash-flow tax are
consumption taxes are quite different, but it is easy to see the connection. In
a cash-flow consumption tax, the taxable amount for a given taxpayer is
equal to his consumption purchases because investments are deducted. Thus,
the taxpayer effectively pays a tax if he purchases a good or service. The
collection mechanism is for individual taxpayers to pay a tax on all of their
consumption purchases during the year (or other accounting period) once, in
18. For a similar argument, see Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Why Is there
Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? The Role of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting,
in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 67 (Martin Feldstein, James
R.Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard eds., 1994).
19. This statement is true only in the most abstract sense on an economy wide basis. Actual
transition to a yield-exempt tax might be complicated, for example, because long-term contracts and
other relationships might not immediately adjust to the tax. For example, a yield-exempt tax would
probably eliminate the deduction for interest for the borrower and not tax interest to the lender. The
burden on debt is not changed, but, absent immediate changes to interest rates, the switch would
create windfall winners and losers.
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a single tax filing. No special listing or tracking of each consumption pur-
chase is required. In a retail sales tax, a tax is paid when a good or service is
purchased for consumption. Businesses remit the tax, and the tax is com-
puted for each purchase rather than on an annual basis. The overall effect
however, is the same. 20
Next consider a valued added tax, or VAT. A VAT is simply a compli-
cated method of collecting a retail-sales tax. A VAT collects the tax on each
good at each stage of production rather than only at the retail level. The rea-
son most nations impose a VAT rather than a retail-sales tax is that avoidance
of a VAT is more difficult.21
Example
Suppose Bigco creates a good from scratch and sells it in the market. To im-
pose a VAT or a retail-sales tax, we tax the value of the good by requiring Bigco
to pay tax equal to the value of the good times the tax rate. In this simple case,
the VAT is identical to the retail-sales tax.
Suppose Bigco purchases inputs from another company. In a VAT, the company
selling the inputs would be taxed on the value of the goods sold. Bigco would
then sell the finished good to the public and be taxed. If we taxed Bigco on the
full sales price of the good, we would double-tax the good simply because
Bigco purchased its inputs from another company rather than making the prod-
uct from scratch. To prevent this, we allow Bigco to deduct its purchases, or
claim a credit for the taxes paid on the purchase, and the tax savings from the
deduction or credit offsets the tax on the seller of the input.
A deduction for purchases and an inclusion for sales means businesses
are taxed on a cash-flow basis. A VAT that allows a deduction for purchases
and an inclusion for sales is called a "subtraction-method" VAT. Note that
there is no deduction for wages and no direct tax to the workers on wages.
Deductions are allowed to prevent duplication of the tax and, therefore,
should only be allowed for goods or services purchased from a business that
has already paid the tax. Workers are not taxed, so the purchase of their la-
bor is not deductible. Like a retail-sales tax, individuals pay the tax only on
purchases.
European countries do not impose this method of VAT. Instead, they im-
pose what is called a "credit-invoice" VAT. In a credit-invoice VAT, busi-
nesses get a credit against taxes for any taxes paid by the sellers of their in-
puts instead of a deduction. Conceptually, the credit and the deduction are
20. This leaves aside many differences between the two systems. In particular, a cash-flow
tax is collected at the individual level so that taxes may be tailored to individual circumstances (for
example, by allowing deductions for special consumption purchases such as medical services, or by
imposing progressive tax rates). The text only attempts to show rough equivalences.
21. The reason that avoidance of a VAT is more difficult is that a VAT collects tax at each
stage of production. Avoidance at one stage only eliminates a portion of the tax. Avoidance at the
retail level in a retail sales tax eliminates the entire tax. In addition, European VATs are designed
so that business purchasers have an incentive to ensure that the seller has complied with the VAT,
creating a self-policing mechanism. The Flat Tax would not have such a mechanism.
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the same-they both provide the same dollar offset against taxes for taxes
paid by sellers of inputs. Both types of VAT use the same method to measure
consumption. As will be discussed below, the real difference is the use of
invoices.
The Flat Tax operates like the subtraction-method VAT described above,
except that it allows businesses a deduction for wages and taxes individuals
on wages. Individuals are not taxed on investment income, just like in a
VAT, or sales tax. The genius of the Flat Tax is that, by taxing wages at the
individual level, they can be taxed at a progressive rate. In a VAT, wages
cannot be taxed at a progressive rate because there is no tax at the individual
level, making the VAT more regressive than the Flat Tax. The Flat Tax, then,
is a progressive consumption tax.
Once again, the difference between a consumption tax and an income tax
is the recovery of basis. If an income tax were collected at the business
level, businesses would not get an immediate deduction for the costs of in-
puts. Instead they would recover the cost over time. The only difference
between the discussion here and the discussion of individual consumption
taxes above is that here we are imposing the tax at the business level rather
than the individual level, but the principles for measuring (and taxing) con-
sumption in the economy are the same.
Thus, the crucial feature of the Flat Tax that makes it a tax on consump-
tion is the use of immediate write-offs for expenditures. If the Flat Tax re-
quired businesses to depreciate assets based on their economic life, the Flat
Tax would measure income. This type of tax has been labeled variously as
an "income VAT" or the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT).22
Note also that one might be cautious in designing the Flat Tax around ex-
pensing as it would be an easy change in the future for Congress to require
depreciation. The design should, if possible, be sufficiently robust to cover
this possibility.
Given that the Flat Tax has an explicit wage tax, and that a consumption
tax taxes wages, inframarginal returns and existing capital, the only reason
for the business-level tax must be to collect the tax on existing capital and
inframarginal returns.23 This is significantly different from the European
systems in which the business-level tax taxes all consumption.
22. See BRADFORD, supra note 15, at 15; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDuAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39-60 (1992) (de-
scribing the comprehensive business income tax).
23. As noted above, another possible reason for the business tax is to prevent shifting of wage
income into capital income. If only wages were taxed, individuals could have firms retain part of
the wage income and pay it out as dividends or capital gains. While this is an important function,
the only taxes that are supposed to be collected at the business level are the taxes on transition
wealth and on inframarginal returns.
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The business-level tax does not apply to all capital. While businesses are
not defined by Flat Tax proposals, not all capital will be treated as held by a
business in any likely definition. For example, personal residences, con-
sumer durables, collectibles owned by individuals, and assets such as land or
commodities held by individuals purely as investments are unlikely to be
treated as part of a business. These assets represent a significant portion of
capital in the United States. Personal residences alone are twenty-two per-
cent of the capital stock.24 The return on these assets is explicitly exempt
instead of being subject to the business cash-flow tax. Because these assets
are exempt from the business tax, they are not subject to the transition tax or
the tax on any inframarginal returns.
Having multiple methods of taxing capital creates distributional and effi-
ciency issues. Not imposing the transition tax and the tax on inframarginal
returns on capital held outside of a trade or business means the overall tax on
capital is lower, and more of the tax burden will necessarily fall on labor. It
also reduces the size of the presumably efficient transition tax, which will
reduce the efficiency benefits. In addition, if the reason the transition tax is
efficient is because it is unavoidable, not imposing the tax on all assets will
reduce its efficiency by making it avoidable-it will be based on individuals'
decisions to purchase assets subject to the business tax.25
To summarize, the Flat Tax is a progressive consumption tax, collected at
the individual level for wages and at the business level for existing capital
and inframarginal returns. The key to the Flat Tax taxing consumption is the
cash-flow mechanism at the business level, which allows expensing rather
than capitalization and depreciation. Progressivity is created through the
progressive tax on wages. Nonbusiness capital is taxed under the yield-
exempt method so the Flat Tax imposes multiple methods of taxing capital.
C. Additional Details of the Flat Tax
Hall and Rabushka provide a number of additional details for the Flat
Tax. To give a more complete sense of the tax, the most important of these
details are briefly described below, but further discussion will be taken up in
the rest of this article.
Interest is not deductible by borrowers and not taxed to lenders. More
generally, financial transactions are ignored, generating neither deductions
nor inclusions. Only real transactions are subject to the cash-flow tax. The
resulting system, used in all VATs, is known as an R-based system.
24. See THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM, supra note 8, at 39 thl.3.
25. This depends, of course, on how the Flat Tax is announced. If it were a complete surprise,
the transition tax would not be avoidable through shifts in pre-transition holdings because taxpayers
would have no time to shift portfolios prior to the effective date. If it is expected prior to the effec-
tive date, the tax will, however, be avoidable.
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* Pensions are deducted by businesses when earned by an employee but not
included by employees until paid (i.e., at retirement).
* Fringe benefits are not included by employees (as roughly true under cur-
rent law) but, unlike current law, businesses may not deduct the cost of
fringe benefits.
" State and local governments and, roughly, charities as defined under cur-
rent law, are exempt from tax.
* Businesses withhold taxes on wages.
* Losses are not refundable, but can be carried forward indefinitely with in-
terest at a rate equal to the average risk-free short term yield during the
year the loss is incurred (i.e., unused losses increase each year by that in-
terest rate).
11. THE OPENNESS OF THE FLAT TAX
The most unusual feature of the Flat Tax is that it is open. As noted in
the introduction, by openness I mean that the Flat Tax allows businesses to
claim deductions that are not necessarily offset by corresponding inclusions
elsewhere. For example, a business may deduct the cost of land purchased
from an individual, but the individual is not taxed on the sale.
Credit-invoice VATs, by contrast, are generally "closed" in the sense that
credits are only allowed for purchases from taxpayers under the invoice
mechanism. In a closed system, transactions generally have no net tax effect
unless they are consumption purchases because a business purchasing an as-
set may claim a credit (deduction) only if there is an offsetting tax on the
seller. This is consistent with the structure of a VAT which is designed so
that credits or deductions offset tax liability at earlier stages in production.
Only when the good or service is ultimately purchased to be consumed is
there a net tax on a transaction.
The openness of the Flat Tax stems from two sources: the lack of in-
voices for domestic transactions and the treatment of international transac-
tions, each of which is discussed below.
A. Lack of Invoices
Recall that the Flat Tax has multiple regimes for taxing capital. The
cash-flow regime applies to all assets used in a trade or business. Assets not
used in a trade or business-for example, land or durable assets held by indi-
viduals-are taxed under a yield-exempt method.
The openness of the Flat Tax comes from the interaction of these two re-
gimes. In particular, the Flat Tax does not have an invoice system governing
the treatment of assets that switch between the regimes. This allows busi-
nesses to deduct purchases from individuals and other nontaxpayers. A
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business that purchases land from an individual may deduct the cost of the
land even though the individual does not pay tax on the receipts.
The economic effect of an open system is that it does not impose a tran-
sition tax on assets held by nontaxpayers on the transition date that are sub-
sequently used in a business.
Example
Suppose an individual owns land worth $100 on the transition date. At some
later date, a business buys the land for $100 and then resells it to a third party
for $100. If the system is closed, the business does not get a deduction for the
purchase of the land from the individual because a nontaxpayer was the seller.
The business has gross receipts of $100 on the sale of the land and no deduction
on the purchase. Its net receipts are $100, and it pays tax on $100. If the sys-
tem is open, the business deducts the cost of the land, which means the business
has no tax liability because the $100 deduction for the purchase offsets the $100
receipt on the sale.
Thus, the closed system taxes the full value of the land held by the indi-
vidual while the open system exempts the value of the land held by the indi-
vidual. The difference between the open and closed systems is the transition
tax. Closed systems impose a transition tax on assets that switch from non-
business to business use, while open systems do not impose a tax on these
assets.
Realistically, the value of the land will vary between the transition date
and the time the individual sells it to the business and will further vary be-
tween the time the business buys it and sells it. These fluctuations in value
do not affect the basic conclusion. For example, if the land changes value
while held by the individual, the expected present value of the land on the
transition date will still be $100 and the expected present value of the tax in
the closed system will be the tax on $100. If the land appreciates in value
while held by the business, the appreciation is subject to the cash-flow
mechanism which will exempt normal returns and tax inframarginal returns.
Thus, the effect of the closed system as compared to the open system is to
impose a transition tax on assets held by nontaxpayers on the transition date
that are ultimately used in a trade or business.
There are some exceptions to this conclusion. First, closed and open
systems are different with respect to the resale of used goods. Suppose a
consumer purchases a car subject to a subtraction-method VAT and then re-
sells the car to a used car dealer. Tax was paid once by the individual when
the car was originally purchased. If the car dealer cannot deduct the pur-
chase price of the used car (because the system is closed), a double tax is
imposed when the dealer resells the car. If the dealer can deduct the pur-
chase price of the used car (because the system is open), only a single tax is
imposed on the use (by two different individuals) of the car. To avoid the
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double tax created by a closed system, European VATs have special rules for
used goods. An open system would require no special rules.
Second, an individual may create an asset through his own efforts and
sell the asset to a business. An open system will not tax the value of the as-
set (unless the individual creating the asset is treated as engaged in a trade or
business). A closed system would tax the value of the asset. Third, in the
example above, if the value of the land increased unexpectedly, it might be
difficult to argue that this windfall is merely part of the expected future value
on the transition date. If windfalls are not included in the present value cal-
culus, openness exempts post-transition windfalls as well as transition capital
(or, phrased alternatively, a closed system taxes post-transition windfalls for
assets that are eventually used in a trade or business).
The discussion above used an individual as the seller. But nontaxpayers
potentially include foreigners (explored below), charities, governments, spe-
cial classes of businesses such as small businesses, as well as individuals. In
addition, most systems are not completely open or completely closed. Euro-
pean VATs are generally closed but often allow deductions for purchases
from special classes of nontaxpaying businesses.26 The Japanese eonsump-
tion tax is open domestically but closed internationally. The Hall and Ra-
bushka system is completely open but could be partially open instead. Note
also that other literature, particularly that by Charles McLure, calls a closed
VAT "sophisticated," and an open VAT "naive."27 I prefer the less weighted
terms open and closed.
The decision to have an open tax will have distributional and efficiency
effects. For example, if the tax is closed, assets that switch to business use
after the transition date will be subject to the transition tax while, if the tax is
open, assets that switch regimes will not be affected. The additional transi-
tion tax imposed by a closed system may be inefficient because the tax is
avoidable (it is based on a decision to shift assets from personal to business
use). But an open system creates an incentive to shift assets to nontaxpayers
immediately prior to transition and shift them back after transition, which
makes the transition tax less efficient. It is not clear without more informa-
tion which system is more efficient. Similarly, an open system has distribu-
tive effects: The transition tax falls more on current wealthholders. Reduc-
ing the size of the transition tax means the tax burden necessarily falls more
on labor.
The major advantage of an open system is that, at least at the surface
level, it is cheaper to administer. In a closed system, each purchase has to be
traced to a particular seller, and the purchaser must verify that the seller is a
26. In VAT terminology, these businesses are known as "zero rated." They are treated as
paying tax at a zero rate so that they are taxpayers for purposes of the closed system.
27. See MCLURE, supra note 8, at 71-79.
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taxpayer. Effectively, invoices and tax registration are required in a closed
system, exactly as in credit-invoice VATs. Conceivably, the Flat Tax could
be closed, in which case many of the administrative and implementation is-
sues would be similar to those of a European system. The Hall and Ra-
bushka plan, however, is open. To highlight the administrative issues in the
Hall and Rabushka plan, I will assume for the remainder of this article that
the system is open with respect to payments to domestic nontaxpayers.
Many of the implementation issues for the Flat Tax arise from its open-
ness. While detailed examination of specific issues is left for Part H below,
some examples of how the open system affects design are useful here to
show the pervasiveness of the issue.
First, consider the treatment of financial transactions. As discussed be-
low, the Flat Tax does not allow deductions for payments on financial in-
struments and, correspondingly, does not require an inclusion for receipts
from financial instruments. For example, interest is neither deductible by the
payor nor includible by the recipient. Consider the treatment of a simple fi-
nancial instrument: a contract to purchase fungible property in the future.
Example: Forward Contracts
A business and an individual enter into a contract in which the business prom-
ises to purchase property for $100 in six months (a long forward contract). The
forward can be settled in cash or property, at the election of the business. If the
value of the property has gone up, the contract will be settled in cash, creating
no income to the business, as the cash is from a financial transaction. If the
value of the property has gone down, the contract will be settled by delivery of
the property; its subsequent resale into the market produces a deduction for the
business.
There are two possible outcomes. When the value of the property has
gone down, the business will have deductible losses; when the value has
gone up, the business will have exempt gains. Thus, a contract that has no
expected economic value will generate expected tax losses. Moreover, the
parties can take offsetting short and long positions in the same commodity (a
straddle). The parties would then have no risk, and the business would al-
ways end up with a deduction (on the long position if the property value goes
down and on the short position if the property value goes up). Given that no
risk is involved, businesses can use this type of transaction to eliminate busi-
ness taxes at any time by simply doing it in greater size.
This transaction works because the Flat Tax is open, and ignores finan-
cial transactions. If the tax were closed, the purchase of the asset from the
individual or other nontaxpayer would not be deductible and the problem
would be solved. European VATs, for example, do not have problems with
this transaction. Many other problems with the taxation of financial transac-
tions are the result of the openness of the Flat Tax.
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Second, consider valuation problems created by an open system. An in-
dividual who owns a profitable business could sell an asset to the business
for a wildly inflated price (using funds loaned to the business by the individ-
ual to make the payment). The business could claim a deduction and the in-
dividual would have no corresponding inclusion. This means the govern-
ment has to police the price of sales between businesses and owners in an
open system. Effectively, transfer pricing problems familiar in the intema-
tional income tax context become prevalent domestically in the Flat Tax.
Third, consider the treatment of losses. European VATs allow full re-
fundability of losses. That is, the government makes a payment to busi-
nesses that have credits in excess of their tax liability. This is necessary to
ensure that the net result of transactions between businesses is zero (with net
tax receipts attributable to purchases by consumers from businesses). If
there are no invoices, the possibility of losses being claimed improperly all
but precludes their full refundability. The individual described above who
mispriced an asset to offset taxes paid by the business could, if losses were
refundable, require the government to write checks. This is generally viewed
as intolerable, and Hall and Rabushka therefore proposed that losses not be
refundable. Instead, losses are carried forward and increased each year by a
very low interest rate.28
Nonrefundability of losses, however, creates enormous administrative
problems because transactions between businesses can generate tax liability.
For example, suppose a business forms a subsidiary that will engage in a
speculative research venture that will not produce profits until far into the
future. If the business contributes assets to the subsidiary and the contribu-
tion is treated as a taxable sale or exchange, the business would have an in-
clusion equal to the value of the assets but the subsidiary would have nonre-
fundable losses. This means that special rules, such as the current nonrecog-
nition rules, will be needed to prevent mistaxation of these types of transac-
tions. Effectively, large portions of the current corporate or partnership tax
rules might have to be incorporated into the Flat Tax.
Finally, consider the treatment of small businesses. Suppose that, for
administrative reasons, small businesses are exempt from tax. Consider a
small business that provides services to larger businesses, e.g., a small law
firm or computer support firm. That is, the small business operates at the
wholesale rather than retail level. Suppose the price of the inputs (including
wages) of the small firm is $100 and it charges $110 for its services. The
small firm cannot deduct the cost of its inputs, although the seller of the in-
puts will pay taxes. Effectively, exemption from tax means the small busi-
ness is treated as a consumer of its inputs.
28. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 144-45.
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If the tax system is open, the purchasing business will deduct the $110
cost of the services. This deduction covers not only the $10 of value added
by the small business but also $100 for inputs of the small business, which
the tax-exempt small business could not deduct. The net benefit of exemp-
tion in an open system is the tax on the value added by the exempt business.
If the tax system is closed, the large business gets no deduction for the
$110 purchase. If it resells the product for $110, all $110 in gross receipts
are taxed. That is, both the $10 value of added by and the $100 of inputs
used by the small business are taxed. But the $100 of inputs to the small
business were already taxed because the exempt small business could not
deduct its costs on purchase. This means the inputs of small businesses op-
erating at the wholesale level are double taxed.29 This is why small business
exemptions in the European system are used almost entirely by retail busi-
nesses, and other small businesses often elect to be taxed.30 For wholesale
businesses, being taxed results in lower net tax payments than exemption!
These examples show that the openness of the system will affect many
design decisions, making some, such as the treatment of financial instru-
ments and losses, more difficult, and some, such as the treatment of small
businesses, easier.
B. International Operation of the Flat Tax
The Flat Tax is unique in its treatment of international transactions be-
cause it taxes exports and exempts imports. As explained below, all other
VATs exempt exports and tax imports. Although one might initially think
that the difference is economically important, it turns out to have no major
effects on trade. Instead, the most important implication is that this treat-
ment makes the Flat Tax open internationally. This Part describes the Flat
Tax's international system and the economics behind it. Design issues are
sketched in this Part and are discussed in more detail in Part III below.31
1. Background.
The Flat Tax is a territorial, origin-based consumption tax. A territorial
tax does not tax foreign earnings, dividends, or interest of U.S. taxpayers.
By contrast, the current income tax taxes worldwide income of U.S. taxpay-
29. Small businesses operating at the retail level do not have this problem in a closed system
as there is no resale by the purchasing consumer.
30. See, e.g., William J. Turnier, Designing an Efficient Value Added Tax, 39 TAX. L. REV.
435, 459 (1984) (reporting on the British VAT).
31. For an excellent analysis of international aspects of consumption taxes, see generally
Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals,
48 NAT'L TAx J. 619 (1995) (examining the effects of the Flat Tax on cross-border investment and
trade, and international tax administration and compliance).
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ers (although the taxation of the income is often deferred until repatriation).
Territorial jurisdiction is typical of consumption taxes imposed throughout
the world.
Under an origin-based consumption tax, a taxpayer gets a deduction for
imports and pays tax on exports. This treatment applies whether there is a
cross-border purchase or sale, or the business simply ships the good across
the border to a branch (in which case the deduction or inclusion is based on a
hypothetical sale at fair market value at the border). Effectively, the tax is
imposed on domestic production, regardless of where the product is con-
sumed.
Example
Export. An automobile is produced domestically and sold to a retailer in Ger-
many for resale and use in Germany. When the car is exported, a tax is im-
posed on the sale of the car, just like any other sale by the business. The value
of the production in the U.S. is taxed, but any value added in Germany, for ex-
ample, through retailing, is not taxed by the U.S.
Import. A German automobile is purchased by a U.S. retailer for resale in the
U.S. The retailer deducts the cost of the purchase, like any other business pur-
chase. Only the value added in the U.S. by the retailer would be taxed (i.e., the
difference between the price paid by the retailer and the sales price to the con-
sumer).
The Flat Tax is open internationally because it is origin-based. The
German car maker is not subject to the Flat Tax when it sells the car to the
U.S. retailer, so the retailer gets a deduction even though there is no offset-
ting inclusion.
No existing VAT is origin-based.32 Instead, VATs are uniformly imposed
on a destination basis. Under a destination-based tax, imports are not de-
ductible and exports are not taxable. The tax base in a destination-based tax
is domestic consumption.
Example
Export. Under a destination-based tax, the same car sold in Germany would
bear no U.S. tax. Under a subtraction-method tax, like the Flat Tax, no tax
would be imposed on the sale, but the selling business would still get a deduc-
tion for its inputs, effectively offsetting any tax imposed at prior levels of pro-
duction.
32. See Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects of Funda-
mental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1047-48 & n.83 (1997) (describing
international VAT rules for cross-border activity). The European Union ("EU") has proposed to
make European VATs origin-based with respect to commerce internal to the EU. These VATs,
however, would remain on the destination basis for external commerce. The proposal, therefore,
would effectively treat the EU as a single country for purposes of the VAT. See Anne Murrath,
Harmonizing VAT in the EU A Progress Report, J. INT'L TAX'N, Aug. 1999, at 37.
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Import. If a car is imported into the U.S., no deduction is allowed to the im-
porter. When the importer sells the car, the receipts are taxed, so that the full
value of the consumption in the U.S. is taxed here.
In the above example, Germany will probably impose a destination-
based consumption tax. Thus, if the U.S. imposes an origin-based tax and
Germany imposes a destination-based tax, a car exported to Germany from
the U.S. will bear U.S. tax and German tax. If the car were produced in
Germany and sold in the U.S., then Germany would not impose a tax under
its destination-based system, nor would the U.S. impose a tax under its ori-
gin-based system. U.S. exports, therefore, bear a double tax and imports
bear no tax. This is obviously not the strongest political selling point of the
Flat Tax. (Note that this leaves aside questions about foreign income taxes.)
Economists argue, however, that exchange rates will adjust to eliminate
adverse effects as long as the tax is imposed uniformly among on all goods
in the economy. This argument is summarized below. The major design is-
sues created by an origin-based system stems from its openness, and the
problems created by an international open system are largely the same as the
domestic problems highlighted above. The following discusses the basics of
the economic analysis.
Destination-based consumption taxes do not alter international cash
flows relative to a world with no taxes. Consider the initial imposition of a
uniform destination-based VAT. All prices in the economy would increase
by the tax. There would, however, be no effect on trade flows. Because all
taxes would be removed on exports, exports would not be affected. Imports
would bear a tax, but so would all competing goods; therefore, relative prices
would remain unchanged, and imports would not be affected either.
Origin-based taxes are equivalent on the margin to destination-based
taxes. Suppose the destination-based consumption tax was replaced with an
origin-based consumption tax. Now a tax is imposed on exports, maling
U.S. goods more expensive than other goods, and no tax is imposed on im-
ports, making foreign goods cheaper than U.S. goods. There will be less
demand for U.S. dollars by foreigners and more demand for foreign currency
by U.S. nationals. Relative to other currencies, the dollar will weaken and,
given consumers' preferences for U.S. and foreign goods, the change in the
value of the dollar will eliminate the effect of the tax.33
33. Michael Graetz gives the following example from Professor Alvin Warren of switching
from an origin-based to a destination-based tax:
Suppose that the U.S. has an origin-based VAT of 10 percent with no border adjustments,
and that a U.S. consumer product which costs $100 to produce will sell for $110, including the
tax, whether sold in the U.S. or for export. Assume that a comparable product is produced in
country Z and sells for 1 IOZ in the local zed currency. Assume further that the exchange rate
between the U.S. dollar and the Z zed is $1 = IZ. Finally, for simplicity, assume that there are
no transportation costs for shipping the products.
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These currency adjustments are not intuitive to most people. The double
taxation of exports and the zero taxation of imports will be immediately ob-
vious to any observer, but there will be no easy way to prove that currencies
have adjusted. We will have to rely on the economists' logic and, potentially,
complex empirical studies. Thus, despite assurances by economists, origin-
based taxes like the Flat Tax are likely to face serious political problems.
Also note that the preceding logic only applies to uniform taxes. Inevi-
tably, some goods will not be taxed (e.g., goods sold by small businesses or
any good given a special preference). Currency prices, however, will only
adjust in the aggregate to the overall level of taxation. Thus, a sector of the
economy that is taxed more heavily than the economy as a whole would be
disadvantaged under the origin-based tax, and a sector that is taxed more
lightly would be at an advantage.
Under these conditions, consumers in the U.S. and Z will choose between the two prod-
ucts on the assumption that they will sell for identical prices. Consumers in Z have the choice
of buying the Z product for I10Z or buying the U.S. product for $110, which will require
l1OZ. Similarly, U.S. consumers can buy either product for $110. A U.S. producer has the
choice of selling in the U.S. market for $110 or exporting for 11OZ, which will yield $110. In
either case, the U.S. producer would retain $100 after payment of U.S. taxes.
What will happen if the U.S. replaces its origin-based VAT with a destination-based
VAT that exempts exports and taxes imports? Initially, the Z product appears more expensive
to U.S. consumers than the U.S. product, because the Z product will sell for $121 (the old price
of $I0 plus the new 10 percent tax), whereas the U.S. product will still sell for $110. Simi-
larly, the U.S. product now looks less expensive than the Z product to Z consumers, because
the tax rebate means that the U.S. product can now be exported from the U.S. for $100. The
U.S. producer might therefore think it has an advantage in Z, where the comparable local
product continues to sell for IIOZ. Hence it is often argued that a destination-based VAT
would stimulate exports, and that an origin-based VAT would not.
Now consider what happens when the U.S. and Z consumers start to switch from Z prod-
ucts to U.S. products, because the latter appear to be less expensive. That switch would mean
that there would be less demand for the Z currency by U.S. nationals (who are reducing their
imports of the Z product) and more demand for the U.S. currency by Z nationals (who are in-
creasing their imports of the U.S. product). Given this change in demand, the value of the
dollar will rise relative to the zed until there is no longer any advantage to switching from Z
products to U.S. products, given the consumers' preferences relating to matters other than
price, which preferences are independent of the tax law. In this simple example, the value of
the dollar would rise until $1 could be exchanged for 1.IZ.
U.S. consumers would then have the choice between buying the U.S. product for $110
(including the tax) or the Z product for $100 (which would exchange for lIOZ) plus the 10
percent tax on imports, for a total of $110. Z consumers would have the choice between buy-
ing the Z product for 1 IOZ or the U.S. product for $100, which would require I IOZ. A U.S.
producer could sell the U.S. product at home for $110 (including $10 in VAT) or abroad for
1 IOZ, which would yield $100, on which no U.S. tax would be due. In either case, the U.S.
producer would retain $100 after payment of U.S. taxes.
Taking into account the change in exchange rates brought about by the change in relative
prices of the U.S. and Z products due to the introduction of border adjustments, the destina-
tion-based VAT has no advantage over the origin-based VAT in terms of stimulating exports
in this example. One of the U.S. products under discussion exchanges for one of the Z prod-
ucts in both the U.S. and country Z under both taxes. The U.S. producer earns the same amount
from a sale at home and a sale abroad under either tax.
Michael J. Graetz, International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Restructuring: Practice or Principle?,
51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1093, 1101 n.15 (1997).
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Origin-based and destination-based taxes differ with respect to infra-
marginal returns and the transition tax. An origin-based tax taxes inframar-
ginal returns on inbound investments and imposes a transition tax on foreign
investors in U.S. assets. A destination-based tax taxes inframarginal returns
on outbound investments and imposes a transition tax on U.S. taxpayers in-
vesting abroad.
Consider inframarginal returns first. Suppose that a U.S. corporation
makes an investment abroad. Say it builds a plant abroad to produce goods
sold here. Under a destination-based tax, any U.S. tax is rebated at the bor-
der and any import is taxed at the border. Effectively, the export of the plant
(i.e., building it abroad) is deducted and the import of the goods produced by
the plant is taxed. Destination-based taxes give cash-flow treatment to for-
eign investments. An origin-based tax does not allow a deduction for exports
and does not tax imports and, therefore, gives yield-exempt treatment. Fol-
lowing the usual difference between cash-flow and yield-exempt taxes, if
there are inframarginal returns, the corporation bears a tax under the destina-
tion principle but not under the origin principle.
The same analysis, flipped, applies for inbound investments. Foreign
businesses bear a tax on inframarginal returns on investments in the U.S. un-
der an origin-based tax but not under a destination-based tax.
The transition effects are more complex because they depend on relative
price levels. The analysis breaks down into four pieces: the effects on a for-
eign owner of a U.S. asset under a destination-based tax; the effects on a
U.S. owner of a foreign asset under a destination-based tax; and the effects
on each of these under an origin-based tax. Begin by considering the case of
a U.S. owner of a foreign asset under a destination-based tax. The cash flow
from the foreign asset is not affected by the tax, but an increase in the rela-
tive U.S. price level reduces the value of the cash flow, which means the
owner of the asset bears a transition tax. Under an origin-based tax, there is
no change in relative price levels, so the U.S. owner of the foreign asset es-
capes tax. The opposite analysis holds for a foreign owner of a U.S. asset-
the change in price levels under a destination-based tax ensures that the real
value of the cash flows from the U.S. asset are unchanged. Under an origin-
based tax, the lack of change in price levels means the foreign owner of a
U.S. asset bears a tax.
One can say much more about the international economic effects of the
Flat Tax, but the preceding analysis is sufficient for the consideration of de-
sign issues. One important question remaining is why the Flat Tax is origin-
based if all other VATs are destination-based. The answer technically ap-
pears to be the GATT, although one suspects cosmetic issues of design also
play a role.
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2. Why is the flat tax origin-based?
The 1994 GATT imposes conditions on tax rebates for the export of
goods to prevent nations from using tax rebates to create export subsidies34
Generally, the GAT allows rebates for indirect taxes but prohibits rebates
for direct taxes. 35 The Flat Tax would probably be considered a direct tax
because it taxes wages at the individual level.36 Thus, even though the Flat
Tax is economically identical to a VAT (with a cash payment to individuals
based on family size), which is an indirect tax, the Flat Tax is treated as a
direct tax and may not grant border rebates under the GATT (i.e., it must be
origin-based).
If the U.S. were truly serious about the Flat Tax and wanted it to be des-
tination-based, one can imagine some accommodation at the international
level. It would be difficult for other nations to insist on a distinction that
makes no economic sense in the face of U.S. pressure. A second reason for
the origin basis of the Flat Tax, however, is cosmetics. Hall and Rabushka
have styled the Flat Tax as an income tax and frequently refer to it as such,
under the apparent assumption that this helps politically. Adopting an ori-
gin-based system makes it look more like an income tax. Moreover, it means
there are fewer changes from current law. The question is whether this cos-
metic difference is worth the disadvantages: being inconsistent with other
consumption taxes, relying on currency adjustments to avoid adverse effects
on U.S. exports, and being open internationally.
3. Effects on design.
The effects of the Flat Tax's international tax system on the design of the
tax are discussed in Part I below. It is worth pointing out here that the most
important implication of an origin-based tax on the design of the tax system
is that it is open. The effects are similar to those of having an open system
domestically: For example, an open system has transfer pricing issues,
problems with losses, and difficulty taxing financial transactions. Allowing
the system to be open internationally, however, compounds the effect be-
cause foreign businesses and their large, concentrated pools of capital are
exempt. Problems with financial products and transfer pricing compound
34. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1997, 67 Stat. A-l i, T.I.A.S. 1200,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
35. See Shay & Summers, supra note 32, at 1048-49 & 1049 n.89 (explaining that tax rebates
on exports of goods under GATT are permitted if tax is an "indirect" tax under the Agreement and
export rebate does not exceed amount levied on goods sold for domestic consumption).
36. See id. at 1054 ("The flat tax... is not a tax on value added at the business level, because
wages are deductible from the base at that level. Thus, under existing GATT rules, the business tax
would clearly be deemed a form of direct, i.e., income, rather than indirect, tax.").
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significantly merely because of the potential to increase their size and so-
phistication.
II. FIvE MAJOR DESIGN ISSUES
The number of individual design issues presented by the Flat Tax is too
vast to cover in a single paper of reasonable length. To get a sense of the
overall system, this Part considers five issues: (i) financial transactions; (ii)
losses and the structure of the business tax; (iii) accounting methods; (iv)
international transactions; and (v) small businesses. The first four are chosen
because they are the core of modem business tax planning and are responsi-
ble for much of the complexity of the current tax law. Because of the com-
plexity of the issues raised by these transactions, the discussion here is nec-
essarily an overview. Small businesses raise extremely difficult and some-
what unique issues in the Flat Tax and are also worth close examination.
These five issues, therefore, should give a good sense of the overall admin-
istrative and compliance issues in the Flat Tax. As discussed below, many of
the design considerations in these areas are driven by the openness of the Flat
Tax. Other issues, which may be equally important, are discussed much
more briefly in the next Part.
A. Financial Instruments
As noted above, the Flat Tax, like a VAT, is R-based, which means it
does not allow deductions for payments on financial instruments and, corre-
spondingly, does not require an inclusion for receipts from financial instru-
ments. Thus, interest and dividends are not deductible to payors and not in-
cludible to recipients. The nominal tax on a financial investment, therefore,
falls on the operating business rather than on the investor. For example, if an
individual lends a business $100 at a ten percent interest rate, the individual
investor has no nominal tax liability. The business, however, will not be able
to deduct the interest and, therefore, will have nominal tax liability on the
amounts it earns with the $100.
Because the Flat Tax is R-based, it must distinguish between payments
on financial instruments and payments on other investments. If the Flat Tax
does not properly distinguish between these two, taxpayers may be able to
shift the tax on investments. For example, interest can be disguised as an-
other type of cash flow that is deductible. This shifts the nominal tax on the
interest to the investor contrary to the premise of the R-based system.
The ability to shift the tax on the return to an investment is a particular
problem in an open system because a deduction to the business (for disguised
interest) will not necessarily be offset by an inclusion to the lender. Thus, to
the extent the Flat Tax imposes a tax on an investment (because the return is
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inframarginal or a hidden return to human capital, or on transition), shifting
the nominal liability to a nontaxpayer avoids the tax. For example, in the
case of disguised interest, the business will be able to deduct the disguised
interest but the lender will have no inclusion.37
The Flat Tax, therefore, will need a set of rules designed to distinguish
the return on financial instruments from the return on goods and services.
This distinction, however, is not coherent. Investments, whether financial or
real, produce expected cash flows. There is little difference in theory be-
tween the two types of cash flows. Financial investments are ultimately (of-
ten through a series of intermediaries) investments in productive assets and
the overall expected cash flows have to be the same. This means any set of
rules in the Flat Tax that distinguish between financial and real returns will
be manipulable.
The current income tax has some rules that distinguish financial returns
from others. For example, many rules apply only to positions in actively
traded property, which, on a rough basis, describes many financial instru-
ments.38 Moreover, current law attempts to identify disguised interest in
some situations.39 But these rules are not complete and do not need to be
because the current tax does not have the same dichotomy between the two
types of payments. The Flat Tax, effectively, will need many of the current
rules for identifying interest and other financial flows plus a host of addi-
tional rules to complete the regime. These rules would be complex given the
wide variety of ways financial and real flows can be intertwined. Because of
the lack of conceptual coherence, the Flat Tax is also likely to need anti-
arbitrage rules. Similar types of cash flows can be created through different
combinations of financial and real assets. These cash flows will have differ-
ent tax treatments which can be used in an arbitrage.
On the other hand, the timing of payments is less important in the Flat
Tax, so many of the current rules on timing of income from financial instru-
ments can be eliminated. (Part II.C below discusses accounting methods
and when timing can be important in the Flat Tax.) Moreover, the capital
gain and loss rules for financial instruments can be eliminated in the Flat
Tax. There will clearly be some simplifications that can be made. The net
effect is probably close to a wash-the Flat Tax rules will have to be about as
complex as those of current law.
37. Note that switching to an R-based tax from the current system will create dislocations
even when the total tax on a transaction is the same. For example, under current law, interest is
deductible to the borrower and includible by the lender. In an R-based tax, it is neither deductible
nor includible. The total tax on a lending transaction remains the same and interest rates can adjust
to leave the parties indifferent. But a borrower with an existing, long-term obligation must pay
interest based on a rate set under the prior regime. See BRADFORD, supra note 15, at 18.
38. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1092 (outlining tax treatment of straddles).
39. See, e.g., 1.1LC. § 7872 (specifying treatment of loans with below-market interest rates).
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To make this discussion more concrete, consider the following four ex-
amples which illustrate the problem of distinguishing financial from real
flows. The first example is the forward contracts example given above. Re-
call that, in this example, the taxpayer enters into a forward contract and set-
tles it in either cash or property to generate deductible loss or exempt gain.
If the transaction is done as a straddle, so that the business is both long and
short the same commodity, the parties would have no risk and the business
would always ends up with a deduction (on the long if the property value
goes down and on the short if the property value goes up). Given that no risk
is involved, businesses could use this transaction to eliminate business taxes
at any time by simply doing it in greater size.
On its surface, the transaction seems to work because of electivity. If the
taxpayer could not choose the treatment after the fact, the taxpayer could not
be guaranteed to win. But taking away the explicit electivity would not solve
the problem. The electivity arises because identical transactions can be
structured as either real or financial. As long as the Flat Tax treats identical
transactions differently, taxpayers will have effective electivity and will be
able to take advantage of it. For example, suppose the explicit electivity
were eliminated by always treating forward contracts as real. Virtually iden-
tical financial instruments would continue to be treated as financial. Taxpay-
ers could buy and sell combinations of forwards and other instruments to
produce zero net cash flow with net tax deductions or inclusions. If forward
contracts were always financial, real business operations could be structured
with long-term contracts and treated as financial.
The underlying problem is that the Flat Tax is R-based and open. This
combination, R-basis and openness, means identical transactions will be
treated differently in ways that can easily be arbitraged. If, for example, the
tax were not R-based, the forward sale would be treated symmetrically re-
gardless of whether the business settled with cash or with property. Busi-
nesses could no longer generate exempt gain. (This is why the transaction is
not a serious problem under current law.)40 Similarly, if the tax system were
closed, the purchase of the asset from the individual or other non-taxpayer
would not be deductible, again solving the problem. European VATs, for
example, do not have problems with this transaction because they are closed.
There are, of course, a variety of approaches to stopping the particular
transaction given in the example. One approach is to identify the financial
and real elements of transactions and tax them appropriately. For example,
the Flat Tax could treat assets that are purchased through forward contracts
as purchased for their fair market value on the purchase date, regardless of
the price paid. Any difference between the fair market value of the asset and
40. I.R.C. § 1234A ensures symmetrical treatment of financial contracts regardless of how
they are settled.
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the price paid would be a financial transaction, nondeductible to the buyer
and exempt to the seller. In the above transaction, if the business took deliv-
ery of the property, it would only get a deduction for the fair market value of
the property, which would make the forward purchase the same as any spot
purchase. The forward contract would offer no advantage.
This approach, however, requires valuation. In addition, it would be
complex for everyday business transactions such as long-term fixed price
contracts. Perhaps for certain contracts closely related to purchases of in-
ventory, businesses could agree to treat all payments on the contract as pay-
ments for a physical good. This would eliminate the asymmetry present in
the example. The details of this regime could be worked out, but they would
be complex. One can imagine many other regimes, but they all come at a
complexity cost.
Example: Installment sale from individual to business
A business purchases property from an individual for use in a trade or business
for immediate delivery. The property is worth $100 today and the business
promises to pay the seller $110 next year. The transaction is documented as a
purchase for $110 without any payment of interest.
This transaction involves an implicit loan. Effectively, the business has
borrowed $100 from the seller at a ten percent interest rate. If we separated
the interest element from the purchase of the physical property, we would
give the business an immediate deduction for the $100 purchase and no de-
duction for the $10 of interest.
If we tax the business on a cash-flow basis we produce the same present
value result. The business would get no deduction for the purchase until it
paid cash. But paying $110 next year is the same as paying $100 today, so
the business is indifferent between the two methods and, therefore, docu-
mentation does not generally matter in this case.
The reason policymakers might care about this transaction is that it al-
lows businesses effectively to elect to treat loans on a cash-flow basis. This
allows businesses to shift the return on the financial investment to individu-
als, a result contrary to the basic decision to have an R-based tax. Given the
equivalence between yield-exempt and cash-flow taxes, policymakers should
only care where the equivalence does not hold, namely in the presence of
inframarginal returns or hidden returns to human capital. For example, if the
interest rate was not just ten percent interest, but instead was contingent on a
return, cash-flow treatment would allow shifting of inframarginal returns to
yield-exempt individuals. The problems presented here would be eliminated
if the tax system were closed.
If we reverse the transaction, there are still problems with identifying
interest, but the problems with misidentification do not stem from openness.
Example: Installment purchase by an individualfrom a business
FLATTAX
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An individual purchases a $100 good from a business by promising to pay $110
in one year. The transaction is documented as the purchase of a $90 good with
$20 of interest.
By overstating interest on the sale, the business reduces its taxable re-
ceipts without changing its cash flows. In the example, the business reduces
taxable receipts by $10 as compared to a true statement of the interest in the
transaction. The individual on the other side of the transaction is indifferent
because no payment on the transaction is deductible. The parties, therefore,
do not have adverse interests and there is a strong incentive to
mischaracterize the transactions. There is no deduction for a payment to a
nontaxpayer, so openness has nothing to do with this transaction.
Correctly identifying the interest element in the transaction will not be
easy because the parties often will have no incentive to negotiate a true inter-
est rate. For example, in a typical retail installment sale (say, the purchase of
furniture or a car on credit), there is not likely to be a comparable, nondis-
torted price to use to determine the true price. Determining the true price
would involve some measure of profitability of sellers or the appropriate in-
terest rate. One can imagine solutions that involve publishing maximum in-
terest rates for various types of loans, but any such solutions would be com-
plex.
This transaction creates problems in a closed system. One would expect,
therefore, that European VATs would have solutions. Nevertheless, as far as
I know, VATs generally have no rules attempting to limit interest on con-
sumer lending. The problem may simply be too difficult, although one
would expect that the amount of revenue at issue would be large and, there-
fore, worth a few complex rules.
The next example shows how taxpayers can arbitrage the distinction
between real and financial assets. It requires a preliminary example.
Preliminary Example: Sale ofproperty and repurchase
A business sells property to an individual for $100 and promises to repurchase
the property next year for $110.41
Effectively, the business has borrowed $100 at ten percent on a nonre-
course, collateralized basis. Because the loan is documented as two transac-
tions in property, the business is taxed on a cash-flow basis.
This transaction is similar to the first example of the forward contract-it
involves a similar forward purchase of property for a fixed price. But the
tax-planning goals are different. In this transaction, the goal is to separate
41. Note that the property could be fungible. There is some question of whether the business
could use T-bills as the property, or whether, because they are financial instruments, the business
would be denied a deduction. But the business could use gold or some other fungible, tradable,
financial equivalent. If operating business property were used, the property could be leased back
during the term of the loan.
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the interest element in the return to a physical investment from the risk ele-
ment. By separating the interest element in a physical asset, this transaction
allows interest to be taxed on a cash-flow basis. This example more closely
resembles the example of an installment sale from an individual to a business
because it allows a loan to be treated on a cash-flow basis. The same con-
cern is present: the shifting of inframarginal returns to nontaxpayers. And
here again, this transaction is not a problem in a closed system.
Example: Arbitrage
A U.S. business enters into an arrangement with a shell corporation located in
an offshore tax haven. In the arrangement, the shell borrows money from the
business and promises to repay a contingent amount in the future. The shell
then uses the money to purchase an asset from the business. In addition, the
business agrees to repurchase the asset around the same time the loan is due for
the same contingent purchase price. The contingency will be set so that it is
very likely to go up at a very high rate.
The cash flows on the transaction wash out. The business can neither
gain nor lose and at all times is in an identical position to doing nothing. The
tax result for the business, however, is an immediate inclusion from the sale
of the asset and a very large deduction when the asset is repurchased. The
loan has no results under the Flat Tax. If the repurchase is set at a high
enough price, the business can simply manufacture deductions.
This example uses the ability to structure investment returns as either fi-
nancial or real to create an arbitrage. The arbitrage puts the tax liability in a
nontaxpaying entity and creates an offsetting deduction to a taxable business.
Anti-arbitrage rules might prevent transactions as bald as this one, but either
the rules will be overbroad or there will be some gaps.
The underlying problem behind all these examples is that there is no
principled distinction between financial and real flows. For example, asset
pricing models apply equally to financial and real returns. Economically, the
two are simply not different and can, therefore, be intertwined in an indefi-
nite number of ways. The transactions considered here are extremely simple,
and I have no substantial economic incentive to find the really big holes.
Taxpayers will have strong incentives to find others, and one can imagine
that many more exist.
Switching to a closed system (i.e., using invoices and a destination basis)
much like the European systems would substantially reduce the problems.
All of the problems illustrated above, except the problems in the retail in-
stallment sale example, would be eliminated under such a system. The
openness of the Flat Tax is central to the design of financial products rules.
If the Flat Tax must remain open, one place to start would be the various
time value of money rules in current law.42 For example, the installment sale
42. See, e.g., IRC §§ 1272-1288, 7872.
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rules would reduce the problem with understatement of interest in the sale
from an individual to a business.43 New rules imposing maximum interest
rates would reduce the problem of installment sales from businesses to indi-
viduals. Special rules for forward sales that allow deduction or require inclu-
sion only of the fair market value of the underlying asset would help (treating
the rest as a payment on a financial transaction). Integration rules or other
antiarbitrage rules would be needed to reduce the problems associated with
creating loans through the sale and repurchase of property. The scope of
these rules is likely to be broad and uncertain and their application complex.
The Flat Tax, however, does offer some simplification in the financial
products world. In particular, the character of gains and losses as ordinary or
capital would no longer matter. In addition, timing would matter much less
in the Flat Tax, so many of the timing rules could be eliminated. Overall, the
set of rules needed would be on the same order of magnitude in terms of
complexity as the financial products rules under current law.
B. Losses and the Operation of the Business Tax in a Flat Tax World
This Part considers two related subjects: (i) the treatment of net losses in
a given year; and (ii) the rules governing business transactions such as for-
mations, liquidations and mergers. These two topics are covered together
because the treatment of losses is central to the design of the business-level
tax.
Hall and Rabushka propose not to allow refunds for losses (i.e., a cash
payment from the government equal to losses in the accounting period multi-
plied by the tax rate), contrary to the uniform rule for VATs.44 While they do
not clearly state their reasons, the apparent reason is the lack of invoices,
meaning that the system is open.45 In an open system there is no necessary
tension between a deduction (producing refundable losses) to one party and
an inclusion at the same tax rate to another party. Without this tension, pric-
ing problems and outright fraud become a significant concern.46 Instead of
allowing refunds, Hall and Rabushka propose to allow losses to be carried
43. See IRC § 1274.
44. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 64, 144-45 (section 203 (d) of the proposed
statute). See also ERNST & YOUNG, VAT IN EUROPE (Adele Boomsma, Anne Ermel, Jim Somers
& Jean-Marc Tirard eds., 1989) (showing that all European VATs are refundable).
45. They simply state that "[w]henever the government has a policy of writing checks, clever
people abuse the opportunity." HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note I at 64. The lack of invoices is the
primary reason why the opportunities exist for clever people to take advantage of the system.
46. The Japanese consumption tax, however, is open (domestically) and allows refunds. One
reason they can allow this is that their tax rate is only five percent, reducing the incentive for eva-
sion. Another reason is that the Japanese have retained their income tax, and there may often be
tension between avoiding consumption taxes and creating income tax liability.
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forward (but not back) indefinitely, increased each year by the average daily
yield on three-month Treasury Bills during the first year.47
The interest rate is set lower than the market rate. Although Hall and
Rabushka do not give the reason why, presumably, if the interest rate were
the market rate, a carryforward regime would create no fewer problems than
a refund regime as the two would have the same present value (assuming
losses of liquidating bankrupt companies could somehow be used, say
through a merger with a profitable company). Thus, the low interest rate
might be intended as an intermediate solution between full refundability or
its equivalent and current law, which allows carryforwards without interest.48
A low rate of interest on loss carryforwards will change some of the con-
clusions about the effects of the Flat Tax given in Part II above. To the ex-
tent the interest rate is lower than the cost of capital, the Flat Tax overtaxes
some consumption. The value of the initial deduction for an investment that
creates a loss will not be sufficient to offset the gain on the future sale be-
cause the deduction grows at a rate that is lower than the market rate. The
greater the difference between the cost of capital and the carryforward rate,
the higher the tax. The cost of capital will be higher for riskier projects but
the refund rate will stay the same. Therefore, the analysis showing that a
consumption tax does not tax the returns to risk would not apply: high-risk
investments would be taxed at a higher rate than low-risk investments. In
essence, the carryforward regime creates a sliding-scale tax rate: Goods and
services produced by entities with higher costs of capital are subject to a
higher tax than goods and services produced by entities with lower costs of
capital.
While the nonrefundability of losses has economic consequences, the
immediate implications for implementation are straightforward. Businesses
would have to keep records of loss carryforwards, adjusting them by the in-
terest rate and the government would have to publish the appropriate interest
rates. Some complications could arise in the Hall and Rabushka proposal
because carryforwards arising in different years would use different interest
rates, requiring complex calculations and stacking rules to determine which
carryforwards are used first. Presumably, a single interest rate could be used
instead. The main impact of nonrefundability, however, is in the design of
the business tax.
To illustrate the connection between the treatment of losses and the busi-
ness tax, consider the tax system if losses in a given year were refundable.
Transactions between businesses would create no net tax as taxable receipts
47. Apparently, the interest rate is determined based only on first-year, average daily yields
on three-month Treasury Bills and does not thereafter adjust. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note
1, at 144-45. It is not clear why it does not adjust, particularly as the rate is a short-term rate. As
discussed in the text, this creates administrative problems.
48. See I.R.C. § 172.
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to one would produce deductible payments to the other, and the refund from
the deduction would exactly equal the tax on the receipts. The treatment of
transactions between businesses, therefore, would be relatively unimportant
so long as businesses treat transactions the same. All transactions between
businesses, therefore, could be treated as taxable. Avoidance of taxable
treatment would also have no net effect (as long as nothing left the business
tax base, say as a distribution to shareholders, without tax). Few business tax
rules would be needed. This is demonstrated by the European VATs which
refund losses and have almost no special rules governing transactions be-
tween businesses.49
If losses are not refundable, transactions between businesses can have
tax effects. Suppose losses were not refundable and could not be carried
forward or back. That is, losses not used against receipts in the year incurred
would be forfeited. In this case, a contribution of property by a business to a
newly formed joint venture, if treated as a taxable transaction, could produce
net tax-there would be an immediate tax to the contributor on the exchange
and, if the joint venture did not immediately produce revenues, no offsetting
deduction to the new venture. We would need nonrecognition rules for such
formations. Similarly, a sale from a profit-making company to a company
with no net receipts (say a bankrupt company) would generate net tax reve-
nues. The profit-making company would have taxable receipts but the bank-
rupt company would get no deduction. There would be a strong incentive for
profitable businesses to acquire money-losing business and rules might be
needed to prevent distortions in the market for corporate control. The vari-
ous nonrecognition regimes and the anti-loss trafficking rules that are central
elements of the current corporate tax regimes will probably need to be dupli-
cated in the Flat Tax because of the treatment of losses. Losses are the piv-
otal element in the design of the business tax.
The easiest place to begin exploring the business tax is with the forma-
tion of a business. There are two polar cases: the formation of a new com-
pany by an individual (or other nontaxpayer) and the formation of a subsidi-
ary by a business. Suppose that in both cases the contributor transfers prop-
erty to the business in exchange for equity in the business.
The sensible rule for the formation of a business by an individual is to
treat it as a taxable sale. Under current law, a formation is generally tax-free
to both the business and the individual.50 That is, neither the individual nor
49. Some European VATs zero rate or exempt the sale of ongoing businesses, creating the
equivalent of nonrecognition under a subtraction-method tax or income tax. See note 26 supra. As
zero rating grants relief only from administrative requirements and not from any tax liability that
would otherwise be owed on the transaction, the zero-rating rule creates little controversy. See
ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 44, for a detailed discussion of the treatment by each of the European
Countries.
50. See I.R.C. § 351 (discussing tax treatment of transfers to corporations controlled by trans-
ferors).
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the business recognizes gain or loss on the contribution. Because individuals
would otherwise be taxed, they like this treatment and generally do not seek
to avoid it. In the Flat Tax, however, nonrecognition would deny a deduction
to the business with no offsetting benefit to the individual, because individu-
als are not taxed on the sale of property anyway. That is, if the same trans-
action were structured as a sale, the business would get a deduction without
an offsetting gain to the individual. Nonrecognition, therefore, would be
taxpayer adverse rather than taxpayer friendly and would give individuals a
strong incentive to structure contributions as sales. As such, it would require
enforcement, such as a prophylactic rule treating all sales between any sub-
stantial owner of a business and the business as tax-free contributions and
preventing third parties from facilitating such sales. A good case can be
made that the Flat Tax should instead simply treat all formations by indi-
viduals as sales.
Now consider the formation of a subsidiary (sub) by a parent corporation
(parent). If the formation is treated as a sale, parent would have taxable re-
ceipts and sub would have deductible payments. But, as noted above, if sub
is a new business that will not produce net receipts for a number of years,
parent's tax would not be offset by sub's deduction. Each year the loss is
carried forward it loses value because the carryforward interest rate is below
the market rate, making the rule particularly punishing for long-term specu-
lative or research ventures. A tax-free contribution regime is necessary to
facilitate the formation of businesses by other businesses.51
Coordinating the two regimes, taxable treatment for contributions by in-
dividuals and nonrecognition treatment for contributions by businesses might
be complex. Rules will be needed much like current law to determine which
contributions are tax-free and which are taxable.
The same problem might occur for distributions of property from a busi-
ness. Again, consider individuals and businesses separately. If a business
distributes property to an individual, the distribution must be taxable to the
business. The business deducted the cost of the property when it was pur-
chased. The distribution must be taxed to recapture the initial deduction. If
not, business could purchase consumption goods, deducting the cost, and
distribute them tax-free to the owners of the business. Liquidating distribu-
51. One question would be whether there should be a control requirement. The current non-
recognition rule for partnership formations has no control requirement, while the analogue for cor-
porate formations requires the contributors to control the new venture. Compare I.R.C. § 721 (part-
nerships), with I.R.C. § 351 (corporations). The best (and only?) argument for a control require-
ment would be that it limits loss trafficking: Without a control requirement, businesses could con-
tribute property to a loss corporation to soak up the losses. While current partnership rules do not
require control on formation, the partnership rules do prevent transfers of losses or gains to new
partners. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c). Nevertheless, given that the problem with losses under the Flat
Tax will be less than under current law, and that the control requirement is not a serious attempt to
limit the problem, a control requirement may not be optimal.
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tions to individuals would have to get the same treatment as operating distri-
butions.
Suppose that a subsidiary distributes property to a parent or liquidates
into a parent. If losses were refundable, the distribution would never pro-
duce overall gain or loss because any gain to the subsidiary would be offset
by deductions to the parent. But if losses are not refundable, we must count
on the parent being able to use the deduction (for the acquisition of sub's
property) or the distribution will have a net tax effect. It would, therefore, be
desirable to have a nonrecognition rule somewhat like the rule under current
law for distributions to and liquidations into parent businesses.52
The rules governing corporate acquisitions raise similar issues. Because
the Flat Tax is R-based, the purchase of the stock of one business by another
is tax-free. But, without a special rule, the purchase of assets of a business
would be taxable. If losses were refundable, the two treatments would be the
same, except for administrative costs. European countries, for this reason,
generally "zero rate" (tax but at a tax rate of zero) or exempt the purchase of
an ongoing line of business, effectively allowing an asset purchase of a line
of business to get nonrecognition treatment.53 If losses are not refundable,
the treatment of a transaction as a tax-free stock purchase or a taxable asset
purchase can make a difference. Buyers with losses would get unusable de-
ductions in an asset purchase and sellers with losses would have exempt
gains on a stock sale.
To eliminate these differences, the Flat Tax could have rules allowing
taxpayers to treat stock purchases as asset purchases, or vice-versa. Current
law has rules of this sort. For example, current law has an election to treat a
stock purchase as an asset purchase and has nonrecognition rules that allow
asset acquisitions to get treatment similar to that given to stock acquisi-
tions.S4 The Flat Tax could adopt similar rules.
If the Flat Tax attempts to harmonize stock and asset purchases, it could
have relatively loose rules as compared to current law for two reasons. First,
the Flat Tax does not have a two-level corporate tax. Many of the rules of
current law are complex because of the need to defend the two-level system.
Second, nonrecognition treatment under an income tax produces different
results than taxable treatment. Under a consumption tax, nonrecognition
treatment for transactions between businesses is usually the same as taxable
treatment (with the exception being if one of the businesses is a loss com-
pany). Therefore, the Flat Tax could mimic the European rules and simply
52. See I.R.C. §§ 332, 337 (allowing tax-free liquidations of subsidiaries into corporate par-
ents).
53. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 44, (describing in detail the rules for the sale of a busi-
ness in each of the European countries).
54. See I.R.C. §§ 338, 368.
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have a line-of-business type rule, rather than have all the bells and whistles
of current law55
The general pattern from these examples is that transactions between
businesses can and often should be treated as nonrecognition transactions,
primarily to prevent the nonrefundability of losses from distorting the results.
At the same time, transactions between businesses and individuals (and other
nontaxpayers) should be taxable.
The limitation on this logic is the concern about loss trafficking. Non-
recognition rules in the Flat Tax would allow businesses to transfer assets to
loss companies to use up losses. For example, without limitations on non-
recognition treatment, a profit-making company could purchase a readily
marketable commodity, claim a deduction for the purchase, and transfer it to
a loss company in exchange for (preferred) stock in a nonrecognition trans-
action. The loss company would sell the commodity and use its losses to
offset the tax on the receipts. The net result is to transfer the loss to the
profit-making company.
Transferability of losses may be a good thing, but it is not the regime that
Hall and Rabushka proposed. There is a significant tension between the need
for nonrecognition rules and the rule that losses are not freely transferable.
The question is, assuming transferability will not be literally allowed,
whether or to what extent rules should be adopted to limit loss transferring
transactions.
One possibility is to impose limitations on nonrecognition similar to
those found under current law. For example, current law does not allow
transfers to corporations to be tax free unless the transferors have at least
eighty percent control of the corporation. Similarly, only liquidations into
eighty percent corporate parents are tax free. Similar limitations on loss
transferability might need to be written into the acquisition rules, eliminating
the hope that many of the complexities of current law can be eliminated.
Current law also has rules that explicitly limit the ability of businesses to
acquire other businesses to take advantage of unused losses.56 The goal of
55. Spin-offs would be very simple. The distribution of stock would be automatically tax free
as the Flat Tax is R-based, making all spin-offs tax free.
One interesting question is how much the design should be based on expensing, that is, on the
exact offset of the taxable receipts to the seller and deductible payments by the buyer. As future
Congresses could easily amend the expensing rules in the Flat Tax, the design of the system should
be sufficiently robust to work in a depreciation regime. If the Flat Tax had depreciation rules, non-
recognition would matter even in the absence of losses. (Once the tax law uses depreciation, timing
matters and nonrecognition offers deferral.) Arguably, little would change because, given the tax-
free sale of stock for cash, it would be difficult to require the sale of assets to be treated differently.
Indeed, elective nonrecognition regimes have long been proposed for the current corporate tax. See,
e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PROJECT: SUB CHAPTER C (1980)
(proposing elective regimes).
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these rules is to prevent the treatment of losses from causing distortions in
the market for corporate control caused by the loss regime. These rules are
very complex under current law and similar rules would be equally complex
under the Flat Tax. There is no clear way to differentiate the bad transactions
from the good so the rules are inaccurate, over-taxing some transactions yet
missing others that should be covered. Given that increasing losses each
year by the interest rate will mean the need to transfer losses will be less than
under current law, the scope of explicit anti-loss trafficking regimes should
be limited.
Stepping back, it becomes apparent that the treatment of losses means
the Flat Tax generally will need nonrecognition rules to prevent everyday
transactions between businesses from inappropriately generating tax liability.
But these nonrecognition regimes will need all sorts of bells and whistles
both to ensure that transactions between businesses and individuals are tax-
able and to prevent free transferability of losses. In addition, the Flat Tax
will very likely need explicit loss transfer limitations, such as those found in
current law. Effectively, much of current law ends up being recreated in the
Flat Tax.
The one area where the business tax would be simpler than current law is
in the treatment of distributions. The current rules for both partnership and
corporate distributions are complex-the partnership rules are designed to
prevent disguised sales; the corporate rules enforce the double-level tax. In
the Flat Tax, distributions would simply be tax-free and few rules would be
needed.
The overall assessment of the business tax rules in the Flat Tax is that
they would be somewhat simpler than current law, although many of the ba-
sic elements of current law, such as nonrecognition rules and distribution
rules, would remain.s7
56. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 382 (limiting net operating loss carryforwards and certain built-in losses
following ownership change); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-21T(c) (1998) (rules limiting net operating loss
carryovers and carrybacks from separate return years).
57. Current law also allows certain groups of controlled corporations to consolidate their
taxes, which effectively allows a single filing and allows losses of one member of a consolidated
group to be used against gains from another member. Consolidation, effectively, allows businesses
to put subsidiary operations in separate entities for nontax reasons but to be treated as a single entity
for tax purposes. Prohibition of consolidation would force businesses to operate less efficiently as
branches, rather than as separate corporate entities. See Andrew J. Dubroff & John Broadbent,
Consolidated Returns: Evolving Single and Separate Entity Themes, 72 TAXES 743 (1994) (de-
scribing single entity nature of consolidation).
Consolidation has the same benefits in the Flat Tax: Use of losses is important, so consolida-
tion may be necessary to prevent inefficient internal structures. Given that losses increase each year
with interest, the need for consolidation might be less than under current law, but nevertheless, it
would still be worthwhile. In addition, if most of the contribution and distribution problems dis-
cussed above arise in closely held groups of businesses, consolidation may eliminate many of the
problems without the need for special nonrecognition rules. The particular scope of the consolida-
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C. Accounting Methods and Periods
This Part considers two separate but related questions: (i) what is the
appropriate period for cumulating transactions (the accounting period); and
(ii) what is the appropriate method of determining when transactions are to
be accounted for (the accounting method).
An initial intuition might be that the accounting method and period do
not matter in the Flat Tax because, as demonstrated in Part I above, timing
does not matter in a consumption tax. The savings from the initial deduction
for an investment exactly pays for the tax on the sale of the investment. If
the sale is accelerated or deferred, the value of the tax savings from the initial
deduction decreases or increases accordingly because both the investment
and the tax savings grow at the same rate. Accelerating or deferring a trans-
action, therefore, would have no benefit. Accounting methods and periods
(by definition) are used solely to determine the timing of transactions, and if
timing does not matter, accounting methods and periods should not matter.
In fact, one scholar has argued that the fact that timing does not matter in a
consumption tax (so that the timing of realization is not an issue) is one of
the principal administrative arguments in favor of such a tax over an income
tax.58
The examples demonstrating that timing does not matter were correct
within their assumptions. The examples, however, assumed that the ac-
counting period was the same as, or shorter than, the duration of a transac-
tion. If a business purchased an asset in one year and sold it ten years later,
the equivalence between yield-exempt and cash-flow taxation could be dem-
onstrated with ten-year or shorter accounting periods. Suppose, instead, that
the accounting period is longer than the length of the transaction.
Example
A business purchases an asset from an individual or foreigner for $100 on De-
cember 31, 1999 and resells the asset to an individual or foreigner for $100.01
on January 1, 2000.
The business deducts $100 in 1999 and includes $100.01 in 2000. If re-
turns are filed on an annual basis, the deduction would come a full year be-
tion rules could be based on current law or loosened somewhat See I.R.C. § 1504 for current defi-
nitions. The various complicated rules for consolidated entities under current law would largely not
be needed under the Flat Tax. For example, the stock basis adjustment rules of Treas. Reg. §
1.1502-32 (1997) would not be needed as all stock transactions would be tax-free.
Hall and Rabushka would allow completely elective consolidation but imply that it is only
available for "subsidiaries." See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 144 (§ 203(c) of the pro-
posed statute giving rules for filing units). Rules similar to those of current law defining controlled
groups would probably be necessary. See, e.g., id.
58. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in Nav
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR. THE 1980s 278, 278-85 (Charls E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1983) (identifying the shortcomings of a comprehensive income tax regime in
dealing with unrealized appreciation).
FLATTAX
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 637 1999-2000
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
fore the inclusion. For the cost of the tax on one penny, the business gets the
use of the value of the $100 deduction for one year.59 If, however, the prop-
erty were sold by the business at the end of the year 2000, so that the ac-
counting period matched the length of the transaction, there would be no net
benefit or tax on the transaction. The timing of the purchase and sale affect
the net tax on the transaction. There is an incentive to accelerate the pur-
chase of property from, and defer the sale of property to, nontaxpayers.
Moving a purchase up by a few days to an earlier year accelerates the deduc-
tion at a very low cost. Deferring a sale by a few days can delay tax on the
receipts for a year. Timing can matter in the Flat Tax and, therefore, we must
determine the appropriate accounting period and method.
The openness of the Flat Tax makes the problem with timing worse, but
the timing problem would exist even in a closed system. In a closed system,
timing would matter only for final sales to consumers, as the tax from any
other sale is offset exactly by a corresponding deduction to the other party.
In an open system, timing can matter anytime one of the parties to the trans-
action is not a taxpayer. Openness, therefore, greatly expands the scope of
the problem.
The obvious solution to this problem is to have short accounting periods.
If the accounting period were a single day (or a single minute), there would
be no distortions. One day's (or one minute's) delay or acceleration of a
transaction would produce one day's (or one minute's) change in the timing
of the tax deduction or inclusion. Timing would no longer matter.
The problem with daily accounting periods is complexity. While a very
short accounting period would not necessarily require a filing for each pe-
riod, it would require taxpayers to track exactly when each transaction took
place and to make adjustments, such as an interest charge, to reflect the tim-
ing of the transaction. This would be impractical.
Most VATs require quarterly filings, and some allow monthly filings
(mostly to allow businesses to get refunds more quickly).60 Quarterly filing
reduces the effect of timing disparities without imposing enormous adminis-
trative costs. Some similar approach might be necessary under the Flat Tax.
Quarterly filing need only be required of businesses as the accounting period
problem is a problem with the cash-flow mechanism used by businesses, not
the yield-exempt mechanism used by individuals.61 Current law already re-
quires businesses to make quarterly payments, so quarterly filing would not
59. This has been pointed out previously by Michael Calegari, supra note 4, at 695-96 (out-
lining two effective tax postponement strategies).
60. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 44, for a summary of the European VAT rules.
61. The accounting period would matter for wages received by individuals. Deferring a year-
end bonus until the next year would defer tax liability for a year. But this option is available under
current law, and there is no reason why the Flat Tax should police this more than current law does.
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be a big increase in filing costs.62 If quarterly filing is a problem, businesses
could be required only to collect information on a quarterly basis and to file
returns on a yearly basis (based on the information collected each quarter).
The shorter the accounting period, the lower the benefits of manipulating
the timing of transactions (and the lower the penalties for those inadvertently
on the wrong side). The question is whether quarterly accounting periods are
sufficiently short that we need not worry about the accounting method. The
answer depends on the cost of imposing accounting method rules that reduce
problems with the timing of transactions. (Note that eliminating the prob-
lems through an accounting method [as opposed to a very short accounting
period] is not possible because taxpayers will have incentives to actually
change the timing of transactions, not just to manipulate the accounting
rules.)
Hall and Rabushka propose to put all businesses on the cash method of
accounting.63 The reason is that the cash method measures actual inflows
and outflows, so it is uniquely appropriate for a cash-flow tax such as the
Flat Tax. The cash method, however, would be extremely easy to manipu-
late. For example, if a receipt is delayed from the end of one quarter until
the beginning of the next, the loss of the use of money for a short time may
be less than the benefit of paying taxes a quarter later. Similarly, accelerating
a payment from one quarter to an earlier quarter may cause the taxpayer to
lose the use of money for a short time but may be offset by the acceleration
of the deduction.
Current law requires the accrual method of accounting in part because it
is thought to be less manipulable than the cash method.64 Many elements of
the accrual method, however, would have to be rethought for the Flat Tax.
For example, the accrual method of accounting requires inclusion and de-
duction when the fact of the income or liability is fixed and the amount can
be reasonably determined.65 This may occur at a completely different time
than when cash is received and no adjustment is made for the time value of
money. In addition, the accrual method is complex and questions of the ap-
propriate timing of transactions arise frequently.66
62. Note that similar problems might occur if businesses are free to choose their tax years.
Then, a sale from one business to another will not produce offsetting income and deduction as the
timing of their tax payments may vary. The question is whether this effect, which can go either
way (either a present value tax receipt or tax loss), is large enough to distort trausactions and to
require that all businesses have identical tax years, particularly since requiring shorter accounting
periods reduces the problem.
63. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 63.
64. See I.R.C. § 448 (limitation on use of cash method of accounting).
65. See I.R.C. § 451,461.
66. For example, determining exactly when an amount is fixed and determinable is complex
because there may be contingencies, doubts about collectibility, or difficulty estimating the amount.
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An alternative would be a set of rules similar to those used by European
VATs. VATs have detailed timing rules, often with different rules for the
supply of goods and for services. 67 Generally, however, they treat the supply
of the good or service as the taxable event. One reason for looldng to the
supply of goods or services might be that supply is less manipulable than the
payment of cash. The problem with adopting these rules is that they would
be largely unfamiliar to domestic businesses. 68 Moreover, the theoretical
basis for these rules is uncertain as the time of supply might be different
from the time cash is received, creating implicit loans which would have to
be accounted for properly.
Given that accounting rules will matter and that there is likely to be more
than one acceptable method of accounting, the Flat Tax will probably need a
counterpart to the rules in the current law that prevent double counting when
taxpayers change methods.69 These are among the more complex sets of ac-
counting rules under current law-the new Flat Tax counterparts are likely to
be equally complex.
While the Flat Tax will need some accounting rules, the problems with
accounting methods should not be overstated. The single biggest area of
simplification in the Flat Tax is probably accounting issues. The Flat Tax
will eliminate many of the most troublesome aspects of accounting under
current law. The capitalization requirement as embodied in common law
principlesO and in complex statutory rules71 would be eliminated, substan-
tially simplifying accounting problems. Inventory rules72 would no longer be
necessary as inventory would be deducted when purchased. In addition,
timing problems are limited by the length of the accounting period in the Flat
Tax, but are not under the income tax. For example, special rules for long-
term contracts,73 which are extremely complex and important under the in-
See BORiS I. BiTrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS, § 105.5 (2d ed. 1992) for examples of some of the complexities of the accrual method.
67. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 44 for a description of the timing rules in the various
European VATs.
68. Moreover, the European rules would create some problems under the Flat Tax and might
require some modifications. For example, if the supply of goods or services is the taxable event,
prepayments cause problems. Unless interest is imputed on the prepayment, so that the taxable
amount is the fair market value of the goods at the time they are taxed, too little income will be
included. Including prepayments on the cash method would work better. Consider a business that
receives an up-front payment to provide services in the future. If the payment is taxable and the
cost of providing the services is deductible, the usual pattern of an initial deduction for costs fol-
lowed by a receipt for sales is reversed. Nevertheless, an up-front tax followed by future deduc-
tions should still lead to a present value zero tax.
69. See I.R.C. §§ 446(e), 481.
70. See, e.g., INDOPCO, INC. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-88 (1992) (demonstrating
the capitalization requirement's embodiment in common law principles).
71. See the uniform capitalization rules of I.R.C. § 263A.
72. See I.R.C. § 471.
73. See I.R.C. § 460.
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come tax, would have far less importance under the Flat Tax because taxpay-
ers could only achieve deferral for one accounting period.
The net result for accounting methods and periods is that the rules would
be substantially simpler than current law. But accounting methods and peri-
ods would still matter. Moreover, many of the accounting method rules
would probably have to change.
D. International Transactions
This Part considers design issues relating to international transactions.
Recall that the Flat Tax is origin-based, so that businesses deduct the cost of
imports and are taxed on exports. The basic rules for an origin-based system
are straightforward. They are the same as for domestic transactions: Busi-
nesses get a deduction for purchases and an inclusion for sales. If goods or
services are transported across borders without a sale, (e.g., a transfer to a
foreign branch of a domestic business), they are treated as sold at the border
for their fair market value. Similarly goods and services imported into the
U.S. without a sale are treated as purchased at the border for their fair market
value.
The most important problem with origin basis is that the system is open.
The problems created by having an open system, however, are not generally
treated here as separate international tax problems, although they could be
because the relevant transactions are across international borders. Thus, a
problem with a cross-border financial transaction is treated here as a problem
with the taxation of financial products. This Part explores other problems
with international transactions and also briefly mentions transfer pricing
which is a problem with openness not explicitly discussed elsewhere. The
general conclusion is that most of the implementation issues for international
transactions (other than the consequences of openness) are not that serious,
which is important given that some have claimed that these issues are sig-
nificant.74
1. Transfer pricing.
Because goods must be valued when they cross the border, valuation
and, in particular, transfer pricing (i.e., pricing of goods transferred between
controlled entities), is a problem. For example, consider a taxpayer who be-
gins the manufacture of a car in the United States, ships it to Mexico for
some stage of production and then ships it back to the United States to be
finished and sold. If the transfer price when the car is shipped to Mexico is
74. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Implications of Tax-Reform, 69 TAx
NOTES 913 (1995).
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artificially low and the price when the car returns is artificially high, the tax-
payer can shift income to Mexico from the United States. Similarly, a serv-
ice provider might sell services from an offshore tax haven while providing
all the work domestically. Only to the extent value is added in the tax haven
are the receipts properly allocable to the tax haven, but enforcing appropriate
transfer pricing will be difficult.
It is likely that the transfer pricing regime in the Flat Tax would be simi-
lar to current law in both scope and complexity. Because the Flat Tax is ter-
ritorial while current law has worldwide jurisdiction, locating earnings off-
shore may create more of an advantage under the Flat Tax than under current
law, but the extent of the difference is not clear, given the ability to defer the
taxation of foreign earnings under current law. At most, more enforcement
or a slightly stronger set of regulations might be needed. Examining the de-
tails of transfer pricing enforcement, however, is not as important as noting
that the need for transfer pricing enforcement is a very significant fact in
evaluating the simplicity of the Flat Tax.
2. Creditability of theflat tax.
If a country has an income tax that taxes worldwide income, generally
only other nations' income taxes are creditable against the country's income
tax. This is the case, for example, for the U.S. worldwide income tax with
respect to foreign taxes. The issue is whether the Flat Tax would be credit-
able against foreign income tax. Reuven Avi-Yonah suggests that this might
be a problem.75
I do not believe this issue is very serious. On the margin, the Flat Tax
imposes no tax on capital income, so, on a present value basis, credits do not
matter. Effectively, if the Flat Tax is not creditable against foreign income
taxes, the initial reduction in credits when the investment is expensed exactly
offsets the value of the credits from the U.S. tax on the future returns from
the investment.
As noted above, an origin-based tax taxes inframarginal returns on in-
bound investments, so whether the tax is creditable matters if a foreigner is
receiving inframarginal returns for an investment in the United States. But if
the inframarginal investment is specific to the United States, whether the for-
eign country grants a credit will not affect the decision where to invest.
Whether to grant the credit will be up to the foreign country and, while it
may matter to individual businesses, it need not concern us as a serious issue
in implementing the Flat Tax. The only case remaining, where the inframar-
ginal return is not specific to the United States, is unlikely to be a large cate-
gory.
75. See id. at 916.
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3. Treaties.
Avi-Yonah has also suggested that the Flat Tax would not qualify under
existing treaties, thus requiring renegotiation of our entire treaty network.76
Moreover, because the Flat Tax eliminates the withholding tax on dividends,
one of the main negotiating tools in the treaty process, renegotiation may not
be possible. The Flat Tax would, then, effectively toss out the entire network
of tax treaties of the United States. And treaties are important to U.S. busi-
nesses as they provide reductions or exemptions from foreign withholding
taxes, scale back the tax reach of host countries, and prevent discriminatory
treatment of foreign investment by host countries. Renegotiation of treaties
would be a major implementation cost of the Flat Tax.
Tax treaties apply to income taxes. Avi-Yonah notes that the Flat Tax is
not an income tax and concludes that, therefore, it is not covered by existing
treaties. Nevertheless, as a matter of treaty interpretation, existing treaties
should apply to the Flat Tax. Treaties typically apply to "federal income
taxes" and any identical or substantially similar taxes.77 Generally, income
taxes are not defined in treaties. While the Flat Tax would tax consumption,
not income, it is not labeled a consumption tax, which seems to be the key
factor. For example, the United States has previously had periods under its
so-called income tax where, because of accelerated depreciation and invest-
ment tax credits, the tax on capital was zero or negative, effectively creating
a consumption tax. Abrogation of treaties because we adopted accelerated
depreciation and an investment tax credit was not an issue. There is no rea-
son to believe that treaties would be less applicable to the Flat Tax than to the
income tax in periods when the tax on capital was zero.
If the Flat Tax qualifies as an income tax under the treaties, the only is-
sue is whether other countries would abrogate their treaties in response to
some perceived or real threat from the Flat Tax. It is difficult to determine
the response of other nations. There are arguments on both sides and com-
mentators have differed in their speculations.78 All I can offer here is that if
other nations abrogate their treaties, renegotiation would be difficult as there
would have to have been some reason for abrogation. The Flat Tax elimi-
nates withholding taxes on foreign investments in the United States. With-
76. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International Implica-
tions, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1329, 1349 (1996). See also Shay & Summers, supra note 32, at
1074 ("Initially, one wonders why a treaty partner would continue to provide relief from its with-
holding tax at source if the United States did not tax the income in question.").
77. See, e.g., COMI=rEE ON FIscAL AFFAiRs, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL art. 2 para. 2.
78. See, e.g., Grubert & Newlon, supra note 31, at 642 (arguing that other nations will not re-
fuse to enter into treaties with the U.S.); Avi-Yonah, supra note 74, at 921-23 (arguing that other
countries will refuse to enter into new treaties or abrogate old treaties if the U.S. adopts the Flat
Tax); Shay & Summers, supra note 32, at 1074-76 (arguing that adoption of a consumption tax
would place pressure on other nations to terminate their treaties with the U.S.).
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holding is the most important leverage we have to induce other nations to
sign treaties. To help with renegotiation, the U.S. should consider retaining
the withholding tax.
4. U.S. as tax haven.
The decision by other nations to abrogate treaties may depend on
whether the U.S. would become a tax haven under the Flat Tax because of its
low tax on capital. If the U.S. were a significant tax haven, given the size of
the economy and richness of investment opportunities, capital would flow to
the U.S. and away from more productive uses, particularly in developing
countries, which could create serious consequences. Other countries would
be forced to abandon their taxes on capital, forcing the world into less pro-
gressive taxation and limiting other countries' choices for financing their
governments. 79 Avi-Yonah, consistent with his prediction on treaties, pre-
dicts that the U.S. would become a tax haven.80
I think this prediction is simply incorrect. The United States previously
has had a very low, even negative, tax on capital income, and problems with
foreign investors sheltering income in the United States were not sufficient to
cause serious international concerns. And, under the prior low capital tax
regimes, interest was deductible to the payer while, under the Flat Tax, inter-
est would not be deductible, making it much more difficult for a foreigner to
repatriate gains without tax. Moreover, to the extent capital is located in the
U.S., there will be an additional demand for dollars, so currency adjustments
should eliminate any benefits of investing in the U.S.
5. Simplification.
The simplification potential of the Flat Tax with respect to international
tax rules is significant. For example, the foreign tax credit rules8l and the
anti-deferral rules,82 both of which are significant elements of foreign tax
planning and complexity, could be eliminated. Moreover, the source rules83
could be substantially simplified as we would not need separate baskets or
expense allocation rules. The rules for cross-border nonrecognition ex-
79. Suppose taxing capital were efficient, fair, or otherwise desirable, and suppose that capital
is highly mobile. If each country acts on its own, each country has an incentive to have a lower tax
rate on capital than other countries do to attract capital, leading to an undesirably low tax on capital.
Only through cooperation can the appropriate tax on capital be achieved. The U.S., by adopting a
zero tax on capital, would be failing to cooperate.
80. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 74, at 915-18.
81. See I.R.C. §§ 901-08.
82. See I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (the controlled foreign corporation rules); I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298 (the
passive foreign investment company rules).
83. See I.R.C. §§ 861-865.
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changes84 could be eliminated as. any movement of an asset across the border
would be taxable and movements of stock across the border would be irrele-
vant to the tax base.
6. Summary of international issues.
Despite the complexity of the economic issues, the design considerations
for international taxation under the Flat Tax are mostly good news. The Flat
Tax would allow substantial simplification of the international tax rules. The
major caveat to this conclusion is that the effects of openness are treated as
independent problems. The large concentrated pools of international capital
will allow taxpayers to take advantage of the problems created by openness
more easily than a system that is closed internationally (but open domesti-
cally). These problems, therefore, could be classified as international tax
problems instead of problems with openness.
E. Small Businesses
This Part considers the treatment of small businesses. Hall and Ra-
bushka have no definition of a business (other than the useless statement that
each sole proprietorship, partnership, and corporation constitutes a busi-
ness),85 and no explicit exception for small businesses. Discussion in their
book indicates that the definition of a business is intended to be broad.86
There is no small business exception under current law-small businesses,
while subject to many simplifying rules, must file returns and pay taxes like
any other business. Nevertheless, despite the lack of small business excep-
tions in the Hall and Rabushka outline and in current law, there are good rea-
sons for having a small business exemption in the Flat Tax. And like the
other issues discussed, the openness of the Flat Tax is central to the taxation
of small businesses.
To motivate the problem, consider an example given by Alan Feld.87 A
taxpayer owns a home and uses it as a personal residence. This is a durable,
nonproductive asset currently used jointly for consumption and investment.
84. See I.R.C. § 367.
85. See HALL & RAEUSHKA, supra note 1, at 144.
86. For example, their 1995 book has a sample business return in which the business has gross
receipts of about $47,000. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, LOw TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT
TAX 43 (1983). In their 1985 book, THE FLAT TAX, supra note 1, at 67, they refer to a landlord (of
an apartment building) as a taxable business. Note that there is a relatively easy definitional issue
lurking underneath the discussion of small businesses. The Flat Tax needs to ensure that irregular
profit-making activity, such as the sale of a home or of used property, is not treated as a business.
VATs generally solve this problem by requiring regular and consistent activity and explicitly ex-
cluding occasional sales. The Flat Tax will need a similar definition regardless of any small busi-
ness exception.
87. See Feld, supra note 4, at 607.
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It would, under the Flat Tax, be taxed under-the yield-exemption method and
avoid the transition tax and the tax on any inframarginal return. Suppose the
taxpayer decides to rent out a room for a six month period while continuing
to live in the rest of the house.
If the rental were treated as a business, we would, as noted above, treat
the formation of the rental business as the purchase of an asset by a new
business, the rental business, which would get a deduction for the fair market
value of the room. The business would be taxed on the rents, and, at the end
of the six month period, be treated as selling the room back to the original
owner. This system is complex and, most importantly, requires valuation.
The homeowner would have to value the room on the date of the formation
of the business and on the date of the liquidation of the business.
The valuation requirements probably make this treatment infeasible for
many and subject to significant abuse by the aggressive. An initial reaction,
therefore, is that the example illustrates an intolerable situation. The task is
to consider the costs and benefits more explicitly. Note that much of the
problem is caused by the openness of the Flat Tax. If the Flat Tax were
closed, no deduction would be allowed on the formation of a business by an
individual as the business would be acquiring the assets from a non-taxpayer.
For this reason, most European VATs have successful small business excep-
tions.88
There are four reasons for having a small business exception and several
countervailing factors. First, as indicated in the rental example, taxing all
small businesses would impose significant valuation problems. Assets
would be overvalued on contribution, creating large deductions, and under-
valued on distribution, creating small inclusions. (This is simply another
version of the transfer pricing problem mentioned above.) The government
would find it difficult to challenge these valuations given both the large
number of transactions at issue and the difficulty of challenging any individ-
ual transaction.
Second, allocation of costs between personal consumption and the busi-
ness would be difficult if small businesses are taxed. In the Feld example,89
88. VATs around the world almost uniformly have some small business exception, but they
vary greatly in size. In Europe, thresholds range from just above $75,000 in the United Kingdom to
a little under $1,400 in Denmark. See ERNST & YOUNG, DOING BusINEss IN DENMARK 52 (1992)
(registration limit of DKK 10,000, translated using December 1999 currency rate of about .135
dollars per DKK); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 288 (1998)
(148,000 registration limit translated using a December 1999 currency rate of about 1.6 dollars per
pound). The EC recommends an exemption level of about $6,000. See Sixth Council Directive,
77/388/EEC, art. 24, 1977 O.J. (L 145). The Japanese VAT, which is open, has a large exemption,
covering businesses with gross receipts of less than about $300,000. See ERNST & YOUNG, DOING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN 77 (1991) (Y30 million registration limit). Our federal income tax, however,
has no small business exception and businesses of any size must file returns.
89. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
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cutting the lawn will be partially a business activity and partially consump-
tion, and the costs would have to be allocated between the two, as would fur-
nace repairs, shoveling snow, and paying property taxes. There are strong
incentives to allocate consumption costs to businesses as doing so generates
a tax deduction.
This problem exists under the current income tax but it might be worse
under the Flat Tax. The reason is that there is a sharper distinction between
businesses and individuals under the Flat Tax than under current law. The
Flat Tax eliminates all business-related deductions by individuals, such as
deductions for unreimbursed employee expenses. But the same expenses
incurred by an independent contractor taxed as a business would be deducti-
ble. There will, therefore, be a strong incentive under the Flat Tax to be clas-
sified as an independent contractor. Under the current income tax, the two
percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions creates this same dichot-
omy,90 but for larger expenses, independent contractors and employees are
treated similarly. A small business exception would reduce the problem as
there would be no advantage to allocating costs to an exempt business.
Third, the administrative costs of taxing small businesses are substan-
tially higher than for other businesses. For example, a New Zealand study
reported that, on average, firms with under approximately $16,000 (U.S.)
gross receipts spent 500 times as much (as a percentage of sales) to comply
with the New Zealand VAT as businesses with over $26 million in receipts.91
The United States General Accounting Office reports that the government's
administrative costs can be substantially reduced by exempting small busi-
nesses.
92
Finally, a small business exception will not cost very much because the
vast majority of sales are by larger businesses. For example, the GAO re-
ports in the same study that in the United States, when sole proprietors and
farmers are included as businesses (which they would be under the Flat Tax),
0.4 percent of the business income tax returns account for seventy percent of
the income tax revenue. The Japanese consumption tax exempts sixty per-
cent of businesses from tax, but sales by these businesses account for only
two to three percent of total domestic taxable sales.93 Moreover, these fig-
ures may overestimate the revenue loss because a small business exception
will reduce taxpayers' ability to treat consumption expenditures as business
90. See I.R.C. § 67.
91. See CEDRIC SANDFORD & JOHN HASSELDINE, INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES, VICTORIA
UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON, THE COMPLIANCE COSTS OF BUSINESS TAXES IN NEW ZEALAND
64-65 (1992).
92. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Tax Policy: Value Added Tax: Administrative Costs Vary with
Complexity and Number of Businesses 3 (1993).
93. Alan Schenk, Japanese Consumption Tax After Six Years: A Unique VAT Matures, 69
TAX NOTES 899, 904 (1995).
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expenses. A small business exception may significantly reduce the com-
plexity of the Flat Tax while not losing very much revenue.
These four considerations create a strong argument for a small business
exception. Note, however, that only the valuation problem is unique to the
Flat Tax-under the current income tax or under a credit-invoice VAT, for-
mation of a business is nontaxable so no valuation is necessary. The admin-
istrative benefits, low revenue cost, and the benefit of simplifying the alloca-
tion of personal and business items are all part of current law (although there
are some additional advantages to being classified as independent contractors
under the Flat Tax). Nevertheless, these problems are sufficiently difficult
that, combined with the valuation problem, some type of small business ex-
ception may be warranted.
There are some countervailing factors, however. If small businesses
were exempt, business owners would have incentives not to pay wages above
the personal allowance as any wages above the personal allowance would be
taxable. If, instead, the business paid wages to the owner up to the personal
allowance and paid all other earnings as dividends, the business and owner
together would pay no taxes. While the Flat Tax could impose reasonable
compensation rules, a sizable small business exemption would realistically
exempt a good portion of the wages of small business owners. Exempt small
businesses could also provide employees with tax-free fiinge benefits which
would be difficult to challenge through a reasonable compensation claim.
To the extent a reasonable compensation rule cannot be adequately en-
forced, a generous small business exception may make the independent con-
tractor-employee distinction worse rather than better, as suggested above.
Many employees would seek to become independent contractors exempt
from tax as small businesses and pay themselves below-market wages. This
could be policed through the definition of independent contractor, but like
policing a reasonable compensation rule, doing so would be difficult.94
In addition, a small business exception might make valuation problems
worse. Without any small business exception (or a very small one), taxpay-
ers will be able to misvalue assets like the rented room in the above example
to reduce taxes. But an expansive exception for small businesses may exac-
erbate the valuation problem rather than reduce it because valuation will be
required when the business crosses the now higher threshold. That is, for
94. Credit-invoice VATs should have this same problem, however, and they almost univer-
sally have small business exemptions, although they vary greatly in size. Because the Flat Tax is
open, however, a small business exception in the Flat Tax would exempt more businesses than it
would in credit-invoice VATs. That is, in a credit-invoice VAT, exemption is a mixed blessing and
many businesses elect to be taxable. For retail businesses, exemption eliminates tax on the value
added at that level. But for a business selling prior to the retail level, exemption doubles taxes as
the business would not receive a credit for the purchase of its inputs and the purchaser of its outputs
would not receive a credit for the cost. In an open tax, exemption would eliminate tax at both the
retail and wholesale level, which may greater expand the size of any exemption.
[Vol. 52:599
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 648 1999-2000
FLAT TAX
very small businesses, the range of possible valuations will be relatively
small. As the business gets larger, it may more legitimately claim very large
valuations of its assets, particularly as the business develops intangible as-
sets-think of a start-up biotechnology company that can claim to have the
cure for the common cold, or even a one-in-a-thousand chance of a cure. It
will claim a huge deduction up front and corresponding receipts will never
be taxed. Moreover, the business could eventually be sold to a profit-making
business that can use the losses generated by the huge up-front deduction.5
The only obvious conclusion from the discussion is that there is no sim-
ple way out. Having no small business exception would impose large ad-
ministrative costs, particularly when one considers examples like Feld's
rental of a room. A large small business exception creates other problems,
particularly the need to value assets when the threshold is crossed. A moder-
ate-sized exception with complex limitations to prevent abuse may be the
best we can do, but further searching for a solution is needed.
IV. ADDITIONAL DESIGN ISSUES
This Part will briefly consider ten additional design issues to get a sense
of the overall complexity and administrative costs of the Flat Tax. These ten
issues (and the five considered above) are only a sampling of the issues that
-would have to be covered in a complete version of the Flat Tax.
A. The Distinction Between Investment and Consumption
The difference between investment and consumption is basic to both the
income tax and the consumption tax. In a cash-flow consumption tax, in-
vestments are deducted while consumption is not. In an income tax, invest-
ments receive basis or an immediate deduction while consumption does not.
But both taxes must distinguish between investment and consumption, and
there are few reasons to believe it would be easier under the Flat Tax than
under current law.
One advantage of the Flat Tax is that it taxes individuals on a yield-
exempt basis. This means there is no difference between investment and
consumption for individuals acting purely in their individual capacity. For
example, whether a work of art is investment or consumption would not
matter. Whether the purchase of a house is investment or consumption (or
some of both) would not matter. While this seems to offer some simplifica-
95. Another problem with a large small business exception is the need for aggregation. If the
small business exception is sufficiently large, it will become worthwhile to structure businesses in
separate entities to avoid crossing the size threshold. Presumably, some sort of aggregation rule
would be needed and any such rule would be complex. The larger the exception, the greater the
need for aggregation as it will become useful to larger and larger businesses.
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tion, most of the issues under an income tax would be the same under the
Flat Tax because most issues involve a business. Consider three typical
problems involving mixed consumption and business expenditures: (i) fringe
benefits; (ii) home offices; and (iii) personal expenses related to the produc-
tion of income, such as the costs of commuting or child care.
1. Fringe benefits.
Fringe benefits raise difficult issues under current law because they
combine elements of business expense and personal consumption. These
problems will be the same under the Flat Tax.
Consider an employer that purchases a car and allows an employee to
use it without restriction. Under an income tax, if the car is not taxed as a
fringe benefit but is deducted by the employer, the income (and the con-
sumption created by the income) escapes taxation. For example, if the com-
pany earns a $100 profit selling widgets and uses the profit to compensate
the employee with a car, some of the profits go untaxed. The business would
have to pay an immediate tax on the $100 but could depreciate the car, so the
difference between $100 and the present value of the depreciation deductions
gets taxed, but the remainder of the $100 of earnings goes untaxed. Under a
cash-flow tax, the business would get an immediate deduction for the car,
meaning the entire $100 would go untaxed. This distinction makes the Flat
Tax worse than the current tax, though not significantly so.
Hall and Rabushka would deny businesses deductions for fringe bene-
fits.96 This approach to fringe benefits is not limited to the Flat Tax and
similar approaches have been proposed for the income tax.97 That is, there is
no reason to believe that the solution to fringe benefit problems is any easier
under the Flat Tax than under current law.
Moreover, Hall and Rabushka's simple statement of their proposal for
fringe benefits conceals the complex nature of the problem. It would be very
complicated to define fringe benefits. We would have to determine which
meals eaten on the job are fringe benefits and which are not. When is travel
a fringe benefit? Would a fancy room at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, provided
96. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 119-20, 142-43.
97. See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uni-
form Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (1974) (asserting that such side
benefits, when they provide satisfaction to the consumer, ought to be taxed as income); William A.
Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure
Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1099 (1966) (calling for a return to objective-
allocative approach to the taxation of joint business-pleasure trips, taxing the beneficiary for those
days devoted to the latter).
[Vol. 52:599
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 650 1999-2000
FLAT TAX
free to the manager, or meal vouchers for policemen be fringe benefits?98
What about parking spaces, company-provided gyms, and discounts at the
company store?99 What about a corner office with expensive art, fancy fur-
niture, and a secretary to do your bidding? Current law has struggled with all
of these problems. Many non-cash benefits involve mixed consumption and
business motivations, and a rule denying a deduction for fringe benefits does
not reduce or change in any significant way the problems with distinguishing
the two elements. While some fringe benefits, such as health care, are easy
to identify, the complexity of current law stems from difficult classification
problems, all of which would be present in the Flat Tax. Record-keeping and
classification rules such as those found in multiple, lengthy, and complex
parts of current law would be necessary.100
Denying the deduction would also, in many cases, overtax the benefits
because many fringe benefits have some business element. The appropriate
treatment of a fringe benefit that has both compensatory and productive ele-
ments is to tax the compensatory element but not the productive element.O1
For example, under current law, we only deny fifty percent of the expense for
meals and entertainment on the theory that some element of these expenses is
for business purposes. To the extent that the Flat Tax would overtax fringe
benefits, it would introduce inefficiencies in the opposite direction from
those of current law.
In any event, there is no reason to believe that fringe benefit taxation
would be any easier under the Flat Tax than under current law. The incen-
tives would remain about the same as would the complexity of the issues and
transactions.
2. Home offices-claiming business deductions for personal expenses.
Claiming business deductions for personal expenses is a common
method of deducting consumption expenses under current law. Absent a
small business exception, the incentive would be the same under the Flat Tax
(and maybe even stronger as businesses can fully expense all purchases).
One of the most common examples is home offices. Under current law,
draconian rules are needed to prevent abuse of home office deductions. Un-
der the Flat Tax, no deduction is allowed for any business costs of employees
98. See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) (holding that meal vouchers for po-
lice officers are taxable); Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937) (holding that housing
and meals provided by a luxury hotel to its manager did not constitute taxable income).
99. See I.R.C. § 132 (detailing the exclusion from gross income for certain fringe benefits).
100. See, e.g., I.RLC. § 119 (meals and lodging furnished by an employer); I.R.C. § 132
(fringe benefits generally); I.R.C. § 274 (disallowance of certain entertainment, gift, and travel
expenses).
101. See Avery Katz & Gregory Mankiw, How Should Fringe Benefits Be Taxed?, 38 NAT'L
TAX J. 37 (1985) (developing a theoretical framework for the taxation of fringe benefits).
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so only those claiming to run their own business from their home would be
able to claim the home office deduction. But solving the problem by flatly
denying deductions for employees does not help that much. Independent
contractors are the guts of the problem and the problem would be identical
under the Flat Tax and the current income tax.
The only reason the Flat Tax might be simpler is if, as suggested above, a
small business exception is adopted. Then individuals would be unable to
claim a home office deduction until the business exceeded the threshold for
taxation. If the threshold is reasonably large, many cases would disappear.
This would still leave a category of sole proprietors with reasonably sized
businesses who could claim home office deductions, but the category would
likely be smaller than under current law. (Note that adopting a closed ver-
sion of the Flat Tax would solve this problem as well.) Of course, the in-
come tax could very well solve the problem the same way by exempting
small businesses.
3. Mixed expenses.
Individuals incur a variety of expenses that have both business and con-
sumption elements, such as the costs of commuting, work clothing, and child
care. These costs are associated with labor income which makes accurately
measuring labor income difficult.
The Flat Tax proposal would deny all of these deductions presumably
because these costs reflect consumption choices. This approach is similar to
that of current law, although current law does offer some exceptions, such as
the nontaxation of employer-provided subsidies for public transportation or
parkingl02 and the child care credit.103 The problems with properly measur-
ing labor income under the Flat Tax should be the same as under the current
income tax and there is no reason to expect that the implementation would be
or should be any different.
4. Summary.
The Flat Tax will need rules similar to current law to distinguish con-
sumption from business costs. A small business exception would eliminate
some problems, and some of the Hall and Rabushka proposals would be an
improvement to current law. To the extent Flat Tax proposals simplify these
rules, however, the simplifications would work for current law. Design
choices here are readily accessible by looking to current law or the large
102. See I.R.C. § 132(f) (qualified transportation fringe benefits).
103. See I.R.C. § 21.
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number of articles discussing changes. There is nothing special about the
Flat Tax that makes these problems easier or more difficult.
B. Independent Contractors
As mentioned several times above, the Flat Tax will have to distinguish
between independent contractors and employees. The distinction is ex-
tremely problematic under current law. The IRS uses a twenty factor test 04
that is frequently at odds with taxpayers' asserted classifications and there
are frequent significant disputes. These disputes and something like the
twenty factor test will continue under the Flat Tax.
The effect of the distinction between independent contractors and em-
ployees depends on whether there is a small business exception. Suppose
there is no small business exception. In this case, independent contractors
will have to file business tax returns calculated on a cash-flow basis, subject
to the various business tax, financial products, accounting, and other rules
discussed elsewhere in this article. The separate filing requirement, and the
resulting complexity, will be a surprise to many who believed they could use
the postcard return. On the other hand, many will attempt to structure rela-
tionships as independent contractor relationships, happy to file the extra re-
turn for the tax benefits. For example, costs that are deductible to independ-
ent contractors would not be deductible to an employee. If, on the other
hand, there is a small business exception, many employees will seek to
structure their relationships as independent contractor relationships. The
most important reason is that independent contractors can pay themselves
below-market wages, taking the remainder of their true wages as return on
equity.
Regardless of whether there is a small business exception, therefore, we
can fully expect significant controversy, complexity, and litigation over this
distinction. The level of controversy and complexity should be as great or
greater than that of current law.
C. Pensions and Deferred Compensation
The treatment of pensions under the Flat Tax has already been the sub-
ject of preliminary analysis.105 This Part will briefly discuss some of the
conclusions.
Under the Flat Tax, investment income is generally exempt from tax, ei-
ther under the cash-flow mechanism or the yield-exempt mechanism. Pen-
104. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
105. See TAX REFORM, IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
(Dallas L. Salisbury ed., 1997) [hereinafter TAX REFORM].
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sion income in a qualified plan under current law is subject to the cash-flow
mechanism. Employers deduct the contribution to the pension like the pay-
ment of any other wages. Employees have no immediate inclusion, which
can be understood as an immediate inclusion followed by a deduction for the
pension investment. When the employee withdraws the money, the em-
ployee is taxed. Effectively, pensions are taxed under the cash-flow method.
Therefore, the general treatment of investments under the Flat Tax is the
same as the treatment of pensions under current law.106
Current law, however, imposes a number of restrictions on cash-flow
treatment. For example, current law imposes nondiscrimination require-
ments, which prevent employers from offering pensions only to highly com-
pensated employees. In addition, current law has withdrawal restrictions and
funding requirements. All investments under the Flat Tax receive cash-flow
treatment, so as Dan Halperin and Michael Graetz point out, there will be an
incentive to avoid pensions under the Flat Tax if they are subject to these
requirements.107 Effectively, under the Flat Tax, the law could not impose
any significant requirements on pensions except perhaps to the extent the
pensions provide some market benefit above and beyond private savings.
Requirements more costly than such benefits would simply drive savings out
of pension plans.
The Flat Tax removes many but not all requirements for pensions.
Qualified plans would no longer need to satisfy the nondiscrimination re-
quirements, benefit limits, and the restrictions on the timing of distribution.
The employee protection requirements of ERISA are retained, however, in-
cluding standards as to eligibility, vesting, funding, and fiduciary rules. The
empirical question is the effect of retaining these rules in a world where most
of the benefits of a qualified plan can be achieved outside the plan and the
general conclusion is that the reduction in pension coverage would be non-
trivial.108
While the economic and policy issues associated with the change in pen-
sion rules are significant, there are few surprising implementation issues. To
the extent the Flat Tax imposes requirements in qualified plans, the rules will
have to be implemented, and one imagines that they would look like those of
current law. Given the reduction in requirements from current law, it is clear
106. The one additional complexity is that the pension is likely to invest in a business that it-
self is subject to the cash-flow mechanism. The effect is a double deduction on investment and a
double inclusion on withdrawal. As long as the cash-flow mechanism has a present value of zero,
the double deduction, double inclusion has no effect. To the extent there is a positive present value
tax, say because of inffamarginal returns, pensions would be at a disadvantage.
107. See Daniel I. Halperin & Michael J. Graetz, Comprehensive Tax Reform and Employee
Benefits: The Case of Employment-Based Pensions and Health Insurance, in TAX REFORM, supra
note 105, at 35, 38.
108. See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Comprehensive Tax Reform and the Private Pen-
sion System, in TAX REFORM, supra note 105, at 65, 72.
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that the Flat Tax will be simpler than current law. Nevertheless, the remain-
ing pension rules will create significant complexity.
D. Death and the Estate Tax
Current law allows taxpayers to step up the basis of any assets held at
death to their fair market value.109 The Flat Tax has no particular rules about
death, but it does not need to. The yield on investments is exempt, so a rule
exempting gain on death would have no effect.
Hall and Rabushka would eliminate the estate tax.1 10 This raises many
economic and fairness issues. From an implementation point of view, how-
ever, elimination of the estate tax would be an enormous benefit. The estate
tax, of course, could be eliminated under the current tax structure, so that the
benefits from eliminating the estate tax should be viewed as independent of
the decision to adopt the Flat Tax.
E. Tax-Exempt Entities
Hall and Rabushka retain tax exemption for a category of entities that
roughly corresponds to charities under current law."' Other tax-exempt en-
tities under current law, such as labor unions and trade associations, would
be subject to the business tax. Employees of tax-exempt entities under the
Flat Tax would be subject to the wage tax like any other employee. The en-
tity would pay a special tax on fringe benefits to mimic the nondeductibility
of fringe benefits for taxable entities. Contributions to tax-exempt entities
would not be deductible, unlike under current law.
The benefit of tax exemption under the Flat Tax will often be lower than
under current law. The marginal return to capital is not taxed under the Flat
Tax so the business tax only taxes inframarginal returns and transition capi-
tal. Exemption under the Flat Tax, therefore, means exemption from these
taxes. Some tax-exempt entities, such as hospitals and educational institu-
tions, may have substantial operating assets and exemption from the transi-
tion tax would be valuable for these entities. Other entities (as well as edu-
cational institutions and hospitals) may have large endowments. These en-
dowments, however, are generally invested in taxable businesses and the
transition tax will be paid on these investments at the business level.
Because the benefit of exemption is less under the Flat Tax, many of the
details of the existing tax-exempt regime will be less important. Neverthe-
109. See I.R.C. § 1014.
110. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 126-27.
111. Compare HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 145 with IRC § 501(c)(3).
FLATTAX
HeinOnline  -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 655 1999-2000
STANFORD LA WREVIEWVl
less, entities will care about exemption and many of the current rules will be
needed.
For example, the need to classify entities as exempt or not means de-
tailed rules for classification will be needed. Hall and Rabushka define ex-
empt entities as "[e]ducational, religious, charitable, philanthropic, cultural,
and community service organizations that do not return income to individual
and corporate owners."112 Each of these terms will need a definition and the
notion of returning income to owners will need substantial clarification. Al-
though the concept of an owner of a nonprofit is not clear, I assume Hall and
Rabushka mean to impose some sort of private inurement rules like those of
current law.'13
The taxation of non-exempt but nonprofit entities such as labor unions
and trade associations is not clear. The most likely treatment would be for a
labor union or a trade association to be treated as selling services to its mem-
bers in return for dues. Dues would then be taxable receipts offset by the
cost of services provided. Any net receipts retained by the union or associa-
tion would be taxable. If in any year dues exceed expenses, the union or as-
sociation could face tax liability.
Suppose a tax-exempt entity loses its tax-exempt status, either because it
does not meet one of the required purposes or there is private inurement. Its
purchases would have occurred in earlier years so no deduction would, with-
out a special rule, be available for the purchases, but any receipts would be
fully taxable. Effectively, there would be a one-time tax on all its capital.
This is a severe penalty to pay. Some sort of lesser sanction would be neces-
sary. One possibility is to treat the cessation of tax exemption as the forma-
tion of a business, which would mean the business could deduct the fair mar-
ket value of its assets. This, however, would require valuation. Another al-
ternative is some sort of intermediate sanctions regime under which entities
could be penalized without losing their exemption.
Suppose the entity basically retains its tax exempt purpose but runs a
candy store on the side. Under current law, the profits of the candy store are
subject to the unrelated business income tax (hereinafter "UBIT").114 Would
UBIT be necessary under the Flat Tax? There would seem to be no reason to
exempt assets of unrelated businesses held by tax-exempt entities from the
transition tax or the tax on inframarginal returns. Therefore, as Hall and Ra-
bushlka acknowledge, the UBIT rules would be needed, including the rules
classifying activities as related or not.115
112. HALL & RABusHKA, supra note 1, at 145 (§ 301 of proposed statute).
113. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B).
114. See I.R.C.§§ 511-15 (stipulating a tax liability to tax-exempt entities for unrelated busi-
nesses).
115. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 126.
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The private foundation rules would probably not be necessary under the
Flat Tax (unless the estate tax were retained). There would be no tax advan-
tage to forming a tax-exempt entity to control funds because direct control by
an individual would be tax-exempt and there would be no deduction on con-
tribution. Even on transition there would be little or no benefit because a
private foundation is likely to have its assets invested in taxable businesses
which would be subject to the transition tax. If, however, a deduction is al-
lowed for charitable contributions, the private foundation rules might be
needed.
F. Financial Intermediaries
The treatment of financial intermediaries under a consumption tax, in-
cluding the Flat Tax, has been the subject of extensive analysis.116 The gen-
eral problem is that services such as free checking or intermediation are not
priced separately from the lending of money-the prices of these services are
built into the interest rate. Interest, however, is exempt under the Flat Tax,
making it difficult to capture the consumption element of these services. Ob-
servers have noted that the rules for financial intermediaries are among the
most complex rules in a typical VAT.'17
The Flat Tax does not create problems for financial services different
from those created generally by a VAT. In fact, the Flat Tax may have some
advantages over a VAT in this regard. The reason is that VATs commonly
exempt the services provided by financial intermediaries. If the Flat Tax had
such an exemption, it would not cover the value added by employees of the
intermediary as they are explicitly taxed on wages. Thus, failure to capture
the value of financial services provided by intermediaries is of less conse-
quence in the Flat Tax.
Hall and Rabushka provide a regime that attempts to capture the value of
financial services. They would require banks and insurance companies to
report the price of the services they provide to depositors, measured as the
difference between the market interest rate and the lower rate that the bank
pays on accounts that have bundled services.118 Similarly, the service ele-
ment in mortgage interest, in the form of an interest rate higher than the mar-
ket rate, would be added to the tax base of a bank. This regime will be very
complex to implement.
116. See generally David F. Bradford, Treatment of Financial Services under Income and
Consumption Taxes, in ECONOMIC EFFECTs OF FuNDAiENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 6, at 437
(examining the treatment of financial institutions under various tax reform proposals including the
Flat Tax).
117. See Peter R. Merrill & Harold Adrion, Treatment of Financial Services under Consump-
tion-Based Tax Systems, 68 TAX NOTES 1496, 1497 (1995).
118. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 1, at 73-75.
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David Bradford points out that bundled financial services are not taxed
under current law.119 It is not clear, therefore, that it is worth the complexity
to impose the valuation regime proposed by Hall and Rabushka. In addition,
there is at least some argument that financial services are not generally con-
sumption goods and, therefore, should not be subject to tax.120 Without a
special regime, however, financial institutions will consistently generate
losses-they will have no taxable income but will be able to deduct their ex-
penses, such as wages. There could be strong incentives to transfer these
losses which could create large inefficiencies.
In any event, the most that can be said here is that the VAT rules applica-
ble to financial services are among the most complex in the entire VAT sys-
tem. There is no reason to believe that the Flat Tax rules would be substan-
tially simpler.
G. Low-Income Taxpayers and the Earned Income Credit
Hall and Rabushka do not include the earned income credit (hereinafter
"EIC") in their outline of the Flat Tax. Elimination of the EIC means elimi-
nation of a significant poverty assistance program. One in five American
families now collects the EIC.121 In addition, without the EIC, the Flat Tax is
likely to be significantly less progressive than current law, but the Flat Tax
with the EIC may be a reasonable facsimile of current progressivity (for all
but for the highest income taxpayer).122 Pressure to maintain some version
of the EIC may be strong.
The current EIC is generally based on wages but is phased out in part
based on overall income. The Flat Tax, however, does not require taxpayers
to retain records or determine income other than wage income. Implementa-
tion of the EIC, therefore, faces two choices.
First, the EIC could be based solely on wage income. This would sig-
nificantly simplify the EIC. Adding only one or two lines to the postcard
return would allow such an EIC to be included in the Flat Tax. The problem
with this approach is that Congress has never thought it appropriate to base
the EIC solely on wages because those living off of investments with low
wages could claim the credit notwithstanding ample resources. Since its in-
ception, the EIC has included a provision to prevent those with ample re-
119. See Bradford, supra note 116, at 439.
120. See HARRY GRUBERT & JAMES MACKIE, MUST FINANCIAL SERVICES BE TAXED UNDER
A CONSUMPTION TAX? (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
121. See 141 CONG. REC. S8404-03 (June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Roth).
122. See William G. Gale, Scott Houser & John Karl Scholz, Distributional Effects of Fun-
damental Tax Reform, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 6, at
281 (providing a comparison of taxation rates by income percentile under current law, the Flat Tax,
and the Flat Tax with an EIC).
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sources from claiming the credit and these rules have recently been strength-
ened.123 It is not clear that Congress would be any more willing to base the
EIC solely on wages under the Flat Tax that it is under current law.
The second option for the EIC under the Flat Tax is to require some level
of income computations for all those claiming the EIC. This computation
could be relatively simple, such as a net worth test or a realized income test.
The problem is that doing so would effectively put those who claim the EIC,
at least in part, back in an income tax system. Their net payments to or from
the government would depend in part on income. To the extent there are
benefits to a consumption tax for low wage individuals, this second option
would reduce these benefits by partly putting them on an income tax system.
In addition, this option would increase record-keeping requirements consid-
erably for many individuals.
Moving the EIC out of the tax system to the welfare system does not
change the analysis at all. A different agency and different bureaucrats
would administer the system, but the implementation and economic issues
would remain the same. Combining the EIC with existing welfare programs
might reduce costs, but this decision can be made notwithstanding the adop-
tion of the Flat Tax.
H. State and Local Governments
The most significant issue facing state and local governments would be
the elimination of their ability to base their tax systems on the federal income
tax. Currently, many states "piggyback" their systems on the federal system,
greatly simplifying administrative and compliance costs.
Unless states switched to a base similar to the Flat Tax, few of the im-
plementation benefits of the Flat Tax would be achieved. Taxpayers would
have to compute their income for state tax purposes and their Flat Tax liabil-
ity for federal purposes. In fact, subjecting taxpayers to both systems would
likely increase implementation costs. Therefore reduction in implementation
costs requires a change in state tax laws.
All interest is exempt under the Flat Tax. Therefore, the rules for tax-
exempt bonds under current law could be eliminated. This would be a great
simplification but it would have the effect of eliminating the preference for
state and local bonds. Retention of the preference would likely require rules
similar to those of current law.
123. The original EIC had a phase-out based on modified adjusted gross income. See H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 94-120, at 5 (1975) (defending the low income tax allowance on the basis of in-
come). In 1995, Congress added the disqualified income test. See I.R.C. § 32(i).
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State and local governments would presumably have to be subject to the
special fringe benefits tax on fringes provided to their employees. This
raises comity issues well beyond the scope of this article.
I Filing Unit
Problems with the filing unit under the Flat Tax should be similar to
those under current law. Current law compromises between three goals:
progressivity, taxing married couples with the same total income the same,
and not changing individuals' tax situations upon marriage. These three
principles are mathematically incompatible. Under the joint filing system of
current law, the third principle is compromised because tax liability may go
up (in the case of equal earners) or go down (in the case of unequal earners)
upon marriage.
The Flat Tax should have the identical problem with the only difference
being that it is generally less progressive than current law. Thus, the Flat Tax
will either have marriage penalties or bonuses or it will tax equal earning
couples unequally.
The treatment of children is less problematic under the Flat Tax than un-
der current law. Current law includes the so-called "kiddie tax" which taxes
children at their parents' rates. The most important reason for the kiddie tax
is to prevent parents from nominally giving capital income to their children
to take advantage of lower tax rates. In the Flat Tax, capital income is not
generally taxed, so the kiddie tax will not be needed (so long as assignment
of wage income is adequately policed).
J. Transition
Hall and Rabushka propose no transition relief on the change to the Flat
Tax. Businesses would be subject to the cash-flow tax without regard to ex-
isting tax basis. Having no transition relief, while raising political and eco-
nomic issues, would seem to greatly simplify implementation.
Even with no transition relief, however, there will be opportunities for
taxpayers to avoid the transition tax and antiavoidance rules will be complex.
The transition tax is effectively the business tax. Any avoidance of the busi-
ness tax avoids the transition tax. Therefore, many of the rules concerning
financial products, accounting methods, and the business tax can be thought
of as transition tax rules. Rather than complex rules providing relief, they
are complex rules to collect the tax.
Taxpayers will also attempt to recover existing basis explicitly. One ba-
sic strategy would be to sell assets to non-taxpayers immediately prior to the
transition. The sold property could then be leased back or, after transition,
repurchased. Thus, one would expect substantial activity prior to an an-
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nounced transition date to avoid the tax. Virtually all of this activity would
be inefficient and would lower revenues.
From an implementation perspective, the question is whether any rules
should be put in place to prevent or reduce pretransition sales. It is not clear
that any such rules would be successful. One option is an explicitly retroac-
tive transition date that reaches back to eliminate basis for some unantici-
pated prior period. This would be reasonably simple but unpopular. The
alternative is to try to police sale-lease-backs and sales followed by repur-
chases. Any such rules would be extremely complex, although, if sufficient
revenue is at stake, they may be worthwhile.
Transition without relief would also have the potential to cause signifi-
cant dislocation for long-term contracts. The most important set of such
contracts are debt instruments with fixed interest rates. Debt instruments can
have extremely long terms and, if interest rates are set under a system of de-
ductible/includible interest, they may be uneconomic under the Flat Tax
rules. The exact effect will depend on how prices and interest rates adjust on
transition.124
Finally, there is a strong likelihood of transition relief (aside from rules
reducing dislocations from the lack of relief).125 As an article in Fortune
magazine aptly stated, 'Were Washington to disallow the deductions [for
preenactment basis], every CEO-laden corporate jet in America would com-
mence strafing Capitol Hill."26 Transition relief would be complex. Ron
Pearlman explores the various issues in creating such relief. It is not worth
repeating Pearlman's analysis here. It is worth adding, however, that we
would end up with a complex system of partial transition relief combined
with a complex system (the financial products, accounting, and business tax
rules) to collect the remaining portion of the transition tax. The implementa-
tion costs would be high, and the tax would be far from lump sum.
V. CONCLUSION: EVALUATION AND COMPARISON TO CURRENT LAW
The preceding analysis has important implications for both the simplicity
and the efficiency of the Flat Tax. Most students of the tax law generally had
the intuition that once the details of the Flat Tax were spelled out, the claims
of extreme simplicity would be discredited. The analysis here confirms this
intuition. The Flat Tax cannot be as simple as claimed and still both raise
124. See DAVID BRADFORD, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION 36-37
(1996).
125. See Ronald A. Pearlman, Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax
Lawyer's Perspective, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 6, at
393,412 (claiming that "a cold turkey transition... will be impossible").
126. Louis S. Richman, The Flat Tax: It's Hot; It's Now; It Could Change the Way You Live,
FORTUNE, June 12, 1995, at 36, 44.
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revenue and not create adverse incentives. Many of the implementation is-
sues in the Flat Tax would be extremely complex, and one can expect rules
close to the level of detail and complexity of those in current law. The Flat
Tax would not come close to living up to the prediction of postcard returns.
One reason that the Flat Tax is complex is simply that the economy is
complex. A simple concept such as taxing fringe benefits at the business
level, which Hall and Rabushka propose for the Flat Tax, is extremely diffi-
cult to implement because, in a complex economy, there are a wide variety of
ways that businesses can mix compensation and business expenditures.
Similarly, disallowing interest deductions but not deductions for other ex-
penditures, as proposed in the Flat Tax, sounds simple but turns out to be
complex because interest can be hidden. Implementation of the current in-
come tax in a complex economy is complex, and implementation of virtually
any other tax will be as well.
But even given the complexity of the economy, the Flat Tax is complex.
The complexity primarily stems from its openness, both domestically be-
cause of the lack of invoices and internationally because of its origin basis.
An open tax will have inconsistencies and line-drawing problems that are
difficult to eliminate. For example, transfer pricing rules and complex rules
for the taxation of financial instruments will be needed because the Flat Tax
is open. Similarly, the openness of the Flat Tax forces the treatment of losses
to be modified from the usual treatment in consumption taxes, which in turn
means a host of business tax rules will be necessary. Small businesses
should be particularly concerned about the complexity created by the open-
ness of the Flat Tax. This unique feature of the Flat Tax means that many
compliance and complexity problems will be completely new.
The significant complexity found here involved only a discrete set of is-
sues. Brief examination of other issues, such as the treatment of financial
institutions, the earned income credit, and tax-exempt entities, indicates that
further complexities will arise when the Flat Tax is actually implemented.
One should also remember that the Flat Tax considered here was pure-po-
litical compromises were not generally considered. Thus, tax benefits for
powerful constituencies were not included. Such political compromises im-
pose large compliance costs under the current income tax. There is no reason
to believe that these compromises would not be repeated in the Flat Tax and
impose similar costs.
The claim of complexity, however, should not be overstated. There are
some significant simplifications in the Flat Tax. In particular, the interna-
tional tax rules can be significantly simplified, primarily because of the ter-
ritorial base. Elimination of capital gains taxation and the classification is-
sues associated with the capital gains tax are great improvements. Capitali-
zation issues and inventory accounting disappear. These are significant sim-
plifications. Even so, the claims of simplicity by proponents of the Flat Tax
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are wildly overstated. Overall, one should expect a system that is simpler
than current law, but not extremely so. 127
To the extent that the simplifications of the Flat Tax are valuable, it may
be possible to achieve them through tax reforms other than the Flat Tax. For
example, the Flat Tax will be substantially more complex than a European-
style VAT. A reformed income tax, even one that retains the realization re-
quirement, may also be as simple as the Flat Tax. For example, much of the
international simplification in the Flat Tax comes from its territorial system,
which could be adopted in an income tax. Similarly, a single-level business
tax might reduce many of the complexities and adverse incentives of the cur-
rent corporate tax. The financial products rules under an income tax proba-
bly have greater potential to be coherent than those under the Flat Tax be-
cause an income tax will not require the same distinction between interest
and other flows. Accounting methods, however, will be more vexing under a
realization-based income tax than under the Flat Tax, although they are
closer under an income tax to book accounting, which is an advantage.
Thus, many but not all of the simplifications of the Flat Tax can be achieved
in a reformed income tax.
Perhaps more important than complexity, the efficiency claims for the
Flat Tax are undermined by the analysis. The transition tax is thought to be
efficient only because it is unavoidable. But avoiding the transition tax will
be relatively easy. Similarly, the Flat Tax is thought to reduce the distortions
of current law created by incentives to structure transactions to avoid tax, but
these incentives would remain. For example, the Flat Tax will create incen-
tives to structure service relationships as independent contractor relation-
ships, or to pay wages in the form of returns to capital, or to create offshore
subsidiaries, and so on. One can expect the Flat Tax to create significant ad-
verse incentives on businesses. The efficiency claims for the Flat Tax, there-
fore, are substantially weaker than previously thought.
Without the claim of simplicity, and with the claims of efficiency corre-
spondingly reduced, the case for the Flat Tax becomes extremely weak. A
127. Quantification of the compliance and administrative costs would be extremely helpful to
the analysis. It is difficult, however, even to determine the total compliance costs of current law,
although estimates put it at about $75 billion per year, and it is even more difficult to estimate com-
pliance costs under the Flat Tax. See Joel Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of them All?,
in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 6, at 355, 367, 375. It seems
clear that they would be lower, but the magnitude is uncertain. See id. at 375 (determining that it is
impossible to forecast the compliance costs of certain parts of the flat tax).
Slemrod estimated the total compliance costs of the Flat Tax to be about $35 billion per year.
See id. at 367, 375. Slemrod very likely underestimated the costs because many if not most of the
complexities discussed above were not known at the time Slemrod did his estimates. For example,
the mischaracterization of interest, the problems with the loss carryforward rules, and the various
business tax rules for formations and liquidations of businesses create the need for a host of rules
and expensive tax advice. One would expect that most of these rules would be on the same order of
magnitude as current law.
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reformed income tax, or a combination of an income tax and a VAT, can
probably achieve virtually all of the efficiency benefits of the Flat Tax while
retaining the progressivity of current law. At a minimum, advocates for the
Flat Tax should be required to demonstrate that its claimed advantages are
real and cannot be achieved through a more straightforward method.
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